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ABSTRACT 
In the past four decades, a range of policies and governance mechanisms have been created to 
deal with complex problems associated with the use of the world’s forests. Two of the most 
recent international policies are the European Union’s Action Plan on Forest Law Enforcement, 
Governance and Trade (FLEGT) and its bilaterally negotiated Voluntary Partnership 
Agreements (VPAs), and the United Nations mitigation policy on Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). The emergence of these policies with some 
overlaps brings into question the success of these policies: do they build effective and enduring 
forest governance in isolation or in coordination? Focusing on the Congo Basin countries of 
Cameroon and the Republic of the Congo, this doctoral research explored the synergies 
between and the impacts of FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ processes. The key lessons for the 
global forest governance mechanisms are discussed in this dissertation. 
 
Theories and methods from the fields of forestry, social sciences and political sciences were 
used to answering the research questions. Comparative analysis was employed to study the 
interactions between FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ under varying socio-political conditions. 
Various methods were used during data collection, including in-depth expert interviews, 
content analysis of policy documents, and focus group discussions with local communities and 
indigenous peoples.  
 
The study results suggest that institutional and policy factors, especially political culture (e.g. 
corruption and vested interests), are the most important and difficult to address causes of 
deforestation and forest degradation (paper I). Subsistence and commercial agriculture and 
legal and illegal logging remain important drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. To 
successfully address deforestation and forest degradation, policymakers must recognize the 
conflicting interests (conservation vs conversion) that the governments of the countries are 
facing. 
 
This research found 13 cases of interactions and potential synergies between FLEGT–VPA 
and REDD+ (paper II). Both processes can support each other in areas such as safeguard 
mechanisms, information transparency, ensuring multi-stakeholder participation, monitoring 
and reporting and addressing drivers of forest loss (papers II & IV). The possibilities for the 
synergies between and potential impacts of FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ will eventually be 
limited by domestic political processes, institutional silos and the vested interests of powerful 
actors (papers III & IV). Thus, 1) transformational change is required to achieve multilevel 
coordination across all sectors that affect land use (from global to local); 2) national state and 
non-state actors as well as global proponents (e.g. EU, World Bank, UNREDD) and donors of 
the processes should adopt a holistic rather than a silos approach; and 3) the processes should 
look beyond timber legality and reducing CO2 emission to recognize the significant role of 
tropical forests in providing non-carbon benefits. 
 
The results point to the conclusion that fundamental governance reform and a change in 
incentive structures and enforcement will be needed for FLEGT and REDD+ to effectively 
contribute to the global efforts of reducing tropical deforestation. FLEGT and REDD+ and 
other global policies to reduce deforestation should be mainstreamed into national economic 
strategies to help tropical countries shift away from extractive scenarios, otherwise the 
processes will have only a marginal overall impact on protecting and conserving tropical 
forests.  
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1. Introduction  
 
1.1. Global forest cover: continuing deforestation and forest degradation 
 
Forests cover about one third of the Earth’s land surface (FAO, 2015) and are crucial for 
biological diversity and the provision of ecosystem services (Gupta et al., 2013; Hassan et al., 
2009). Forty-four of the world’s 3,999 million hectares of forest are located in countries 
classified as tropical, 30% are in boreal countries, and 26% are in temperate or subtropical 
countries (Table 1). Natural, undisturbed forests account for a third of the total forest area, 
while the planted forest area accounts for around seven per cent (FAO, 2015). 
 
The 21st Conference of Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris (Paris Agreement) recognized the significant role that 
forests play in regulating climate change and providing non-carbon benefits. Forests harbour 
more than 60% of the world’s terrestrial biodiversity (Hassan et al., 2009, p. 601) and store 
roughly 289 gigatonnes of carbon in their biomass alone (FAO, 2015; Köhl et al., 2015). 
Nonetheless, when forests are converted to other land uses – such as agriculture and urban 
development – or are disturbed by, for example, disease, wildfire or insects, they can also be 
a source of carbon emission to the atmosphere. Furthermore, the New York Declaration on 
Forests states that more than one fourth of the world’s population depends on forest resources 
for fibre, food, water, medicines, fuel and income (UN, 2014). It is estimated that “more than 
three quarters of the world’s accessible freshwater comes from forested catchments” (Hassan 
et al., 2009, p. 587). In addition, forests are used for the development of pharmaceuticals and 
as sites for recreational, cultural, spiritual and religious activities. With regard to the 
recreational use of forests, nature-based tourism has increased more rapidly than the general 
tourism market, with annual growth rates estimated to be in the range 10–30 % (Hassan et al., 
2009). Finally, “wood and manufactured forest products add more than US$ 450 billion to the 
world market economy annually, and the annual value of internationally traded forest products 
is between US$ 150 billion to 200 billion” (Köhl et al., 2015, pp. 1–2). The forest sector offers 
employment to millions of individuals, providing another set of economic gains (Hassan et al., 
2009).  
 
Although forests play a major role in maintaining global environmental health and providing 
services to society, the world’s forest area declined by about 129 million hectares between 
1990 and 2015 (FAO, 2015). During the same period, the world’s area of natural forest shrank 
by six per cent. The vast majority of natural forest loss is happening in the tropics, and the 
tropical forest is disappearing at an alarming rate. “The conversion of forests for the production 
of commodities – such as soy, palm oil and beef – accounts for roughly half of global 
deforestation” (UN, 2014, p. 1). Seventy-one per cent of all tropical deforestation between 
2000 and 2012 was caused by large-scale commercial agriculture (Lawson et al., 2014). It is 
estimated that half of the total tropical deforestation between 2000 and 2012 was a result of 
illegal conversion for commercial agriculture (ibid). Small-scale farmers and agro-industrial 
and logging enterprises are the principal agents of tropical deforestation and forest degradation 
(Kissinger et al., 2012).  
 
The loss of tropical forests and changes in land use and land cover across the tropics are 
considered one of the most pressing environmental problems of our time (IPCC, 2013; UN, 
2014). Deforestation and forest degradation, which are responsible for about 10% of CO2 
emission worldwide, are important drivers of global warming (Achard et al., 2014). The Paris 
Agreement urges the international community to take immediate and ambitious action to halt 
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tropical deforestation and forest degradation. Over the last four decades, a wide range of 
legally binding and non-legally binding policy responses to the global environmental problems 
and their diverse causes have been created and implemented, whereas others are being 
negotiated (Eikermann, 2015; Rayner et al., 2010; Saastamoinen, 2009). 
 
Table 1. Reduction of forest area from 1990 to 2015 in four global climatic domains (FAO, 
2015). 
Forest area (x 1000 hectares) 
Domain 1990 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Tropical 1,965,542 1,870,112 1,830,799 1,797,757 1,770,156 
Boreal 1,219,309 1,219,820 1,218,856 1,224,873 1,224,452 
Temperate    617,997    640,892    659,176    673,429    684,468 
Subtropical    325,421    324,777    323,912    319,613    320,057 
Total 4,128,269 4,055,602 4,032,743 4,015,673 3,999,134 
 
1.2. The Congo Basin forests: context and drivers of forest loss 
 
The Congo Basin forests contain the second largest area of dense tropical forest in the world, 
after the Amazon forest. The Congo Basin forests cover 300 million hectares of land 
(COMIFAC, 2013), representing 18% of the world’s tropical forest area, and they are spread 
over six countries, namely Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon (Figure 1). 
The dense rainforests of the Congo Basin sequester two thirds of the carbon stored in live 
vegetation in tropical Africa (COMIFAC, 2013). Approximately 100 million people inhabit 
the region, with an annual human population growth rate of about 2.5%. There are more than 
150 different indigenous people groups, whose lives and wellbeing are intimately linked with 
the forest (COMIFAC, 2013). About 75 million people directly or indirectly depend on these 
forests for food and nutrition, shelter and traditional livelihoods (Megevand et al., 2013). In 
terms of biodiversity, the rainforests of the Congo Basin is the richest vegetation type in the 
African continent, containing about 60–70% of Africa’s fauna and flora (COMIFAC, 2013). 
 
Furthermore, the forests of the Congo Basin have considerable economic importance, through 
the export of timber and non-timber forest products (Nkem et al., 2010). Every year the 
governments of the six countries in the Congo Basin receive millions of US dollars as logging 
fees and export revenue. The formal and informal timber sector contributes about 10–15% of 
the regional GDP and is an important source of employment and foreign exchange (Megevand 
et al., 2013). In addition to tangible products, the Congo Basin forests also provide important 
ecosystem services including water flow regulation, soil and biodiversity conservation, and 
carbon sequestration. 
 
The Congo Basin is still considered a high forest cover, low deforestation rate region 
(Megevand et al., 2013). Nonetheless, unsustainable utilization is putting increasing pressure 
on the Basin’s forests, which has resulted in increasing rates of annual deforestation, namely 
from 0.05% in 1990–2000 to 0.09% in 2000–05 (COMIFAC, 2013). Other sources (e.g. FAO, 
2015) give slightly higher figures of around  0.33% in 1990–2000 and 0.36% in 2005–10. The 
causes of deforestation and forest degradation are diverse and vary geographically. 
Agricultural expansion, urbanization and mining in forested areas are the principal direct 
drivers of deforestation, while unsustainable logging and fuel wood collection for charcoal are 
the major causes of forest degradation in the region (Céline et al., 2013; COMIFAC, 2013; 
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Hosonuma et al., 2012). The underlying causes of deforestation in the Congo Basin include 
population growth, poverty, formal and informal policy and institutional factors, and 
international market fluctuations (Céline et al., 2013; Megevand et al., 2013).  
 
Figure 1. Map showing Congo Basin forests.  
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1.3. Policy responses to tropical forest decline 
 
1.3.1. The evolution of international forest policy responses 
 
The decline of the world’s forests has attracted global political attention (Douglas and Simula, 
2010; Kanninen et al., 2007). During the FAO’s World Forestry Congress in Mexico in 1985, 
the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP) was created to combat deforestation. The TFAP 
was directed by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, in 
partnership with the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 
the World Resource Institute (WRI). Over the course of 10 years, more than one hundred 
countries embarked on TFAP processes, and bilateral and multilateral donor agencies accepted 
it as a framework for their activities and funding related to tropical forests. However, the 
initiative failed to deliver the intended impacts and “FAO got a major part of the criticism” 
(Saastamoinen, 2009, p. 499). The TFAP was later replaced by the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED). 
 
In an effort to halt global deforestation, several attempts were made by international 
policymakers during the run-up to the 1992 UNCED to bring about the introduction of an 
international forest treaty at the conference, as well as through such forums as the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF), the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) and 
the UN Forum on Forests (UNFF) (Eikermann, 2015; Humphreys, 2005; Mackenzie, 2012). 
The two forest outputs from the UNCED negotiations were the non-legally binding 
Authoritative Statement of Principles for Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation 
and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, and a separate chapter on “Combating 
Deforestation”. According to Mackenzie (2012, p. 251), the outputs that emerged from 
UNCED “were little more than symbolic reform since their ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ legal status 
rendered enforcement impossible”. The period 1992–95 was characterized by the change in 
the focus of the UN to develop coordinated policies to promote the conservation and 
sustainable management of all types of forests (Eikermann, 2015). In 1995, the UN 
Commission on Sustainable Development (UN CSD) created the IPF, with a two-year lifespan. 
The IPF was concluded in 1997 with several proposals for actions related to, inter alia, 
sustainable forest management (SFM). One of the outcomes of the IPF was the creation of an 
IFF. The work of the IFF was concluded in 2000 with a report that noted the need for an 
international agreement on forests and made more than 270 proposals for actions related to 
SFM. In 2000, the UN Forum on Forests (UNFF) was created. Its mandate was to, for example, 
strengthen political commitment and action at all levels to effectively implement the 
sustainable management of all types of forest and to achieve the shared global objectives on 
forests, to enhance the contribution of forests to the achievement of the internationally agreed 
development goals. In 2007, the seventh session of the UNFF agreed on the Non-Legally 
Binding Instrument on all Types of Forest. Nonetheless, “UNFF is characterized by limited 
effectiveness” (Mackenzie, 2012, p. 251).  
 
Furthermore, intergovernmental and bilateral and multilateral development organizations gave 
billions of US dollars as official development assistance to promote SFM and trigger forest 
sector reforms in tropical countries (Rayner et al., 2010). However, most of these efforts have 
not been successful in reaching the desired policy goals (Humphreys, 2005). In the 1990s, 
private sector and environmental non-governmental organizations developed sustainable 
forest management certification schemes such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). The 
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ability of these voluntary certification schemes to properly address the underlying causes of 
tropical deforestation – which is mainly linked to poor governance – has been considered 
limited (Damette and Delacote, 2011).  
 
The past decade has been marked by innovative proposals and further attempts to address the 
disappearing tropical forest, focusing mainly on forest governance mechanisms (Broekhoven, 
2012; Corbera & Schroeder, 2011). Such mechanisms have been considered a key pillar of a 
long lasting solution to halt tropical deforestation and forest degradation, and they vary in 
substantive focus (e.g. from climate change mitigation to global trade), geographic scale 
(global to regional) and institutional type (e.g. from intergovernmental/multilateral to 
bilateral).  
 
Two international forest policies1 have recently been developed to address the loss of tropical 
forests in developing countries: 1) the EU’s Action Plan on Forest Law Enforcement, 
Governance and Trade (FLEGT); and 2) the UNFCCC’s policy on Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation, and the role of conservation, sustainable forest 
management and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (REDD+). 
Although FLEGT and REDD+ are two distinct policies that have developed in different 
political arenas (Broekhoven and Wit, 2014), they can be considered efforts to coordinate 
human actions towards reducing the loss of tropical forests. For that and other reasons, they 
can be regarded as global forest governance mechanisms, which include all the global 
environmental and social governance arrangements (Bernstein and Cashore, 2010). 
 
The complex nature of the causes and drivers of tropical forest loss, and the varied contexts in 
which they arise, requires the application of the full range of available policy mechanisms. 
Rayner et al. (2010, p. 16) states that the “complex forest problems require synergetic 
approaches involving a wide range of policy instruments”. Thus, both legally and non-legally 
binding governance mechanisms and other forms of rules, authority and steering are 
potentially useful for achieving sustainable forest management and reducing the loss of 
tropical forests. An exclusive focus on one or the other overlooks the critical importance of 
developing a portfolio of mutually supportive policy instruments (Gupta et al., 2013; Leonard 
et al., 2016). To that end, there is an urgent need to understand how global forest governance 
mechanisms that have been built up over the last two decades interact and reinforce each other 
to contribute to meeting the complex challenges facing the tropical forests.  
 
1.3.2. Policy responses to illegal logging  
 
Illegal logging and the international trade in illegal timber are major problems that have 
negative impacts on governance, economies, societies and the environment (Tacconi, 2007). 
They pose significant obstacles to the achievement of sustainable development (Lawson et al., 
2014). Illegal logging also causes massive losses of tax revenues, amounting to an estimated 
US$ 5 billion a year. Trade in illegally harvested timber is cited as a major source of income 
for criminal activities (Nellemann and INTERPOL, 2012). Moreover, illegal logging is a 
major factor in tropical forest loss with the highest rates of deforestation taking place in the 
regions where illegal logging is at its worst – the Amazon Basin and Southeast Asia (Hoare, 
2015; Lawson et al., 2014).  
 
                                                          
1 Policy refers to a ‘course of action or principle adopted or proposed by government, party, business or 
individual’ (Gupta et al., 2013, p. 34). 
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Illegal logging is an endemic problem in the African continent. Lawson (2014a) estimated that 
up to 70% of all harvested and exported timber from the Republic of Congo was informal or 
illegal (including logging in breach of various regulations by licensed logging 
concessionaires), while in Cameroon 33% of the total log production was illegally harvested 
(Hoare, 2014). In Ghana, 70% of the total harvest during 1996–2005 was illegally cut (Hansen 
and Treue, 2008). Lawson (2014b) notes for the Democratic Republic of Congo that nearly 
90% of logging is illegal or informal. The issue is also prevalent in Tanzania, where at least 
US$ 58 million are lost each year due to illegal logging practices, including harvesting, fraud, 
evasion and forgery of documents (Kweka et al., 2011).  
 
The severity and consequences of illegal logging and the trade in illegal timber first received 
international recognition at the G8 meeting in 1998. The G8 Forestry Action Programme on 
Forests of 1998 identified illegal logging as one of the five areas of particular importance for 
addressing loss of global forests. This helped catalyse many subsequent policy developments 
such as Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) and the EU FLEGT Action Plan. 
The FLEGT Action Plan is an expression of policy commitments by the EU and its member 
states to tackle the global problem of illegal logging (European Commission, 2007). The key 
difference of the FLEGT Action Plan from the previous processes (e.g. FLEG, Criteria and 
Indicators) was the addition of “T” (i.e. “Trade”). This highlights the role of market leverage, 
along with governance and enforcement issues, as a way to promote the sourcing of and 
trading in legal and sustainable timber. The Action Plan defines a set of processes and 
measures to prevent illegal timber from entering the EU market, and by so doing the Action 
Plan aims to improve the supply of legal and sustainable timber (ibid). The Action Plan has 
acknowledged the shared responsibility of exporters and importers to address illegal logging 
as a global problem by putting in place both supply and demand side measures. 
 
Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) between the EU and the governments of non-EU 
timber producing and exporting countries form the cornerstone of the EU FLEGT Action Plan. 
A VPA is a bilateral trading agreement that becomes legally binding upon signature (European 
Commission, 2007). Through a VPA, the EU and the partner country agree to establish and 
maintain the support necessary to guarantee that the timber and timber products exported to 
the EU are from legal sources and have a so-called FLEGT license. This shows that all relevant 
laws of the producer country have been complied with (ibid). An important element of the 
VPA mechanism is the Timber Legality Assurance System (TLAS), which sets out the 
tracking procedures by which a partner country will ensure that timber products originate from 
legal sources.  
 
The first VPA to be formally concluded was with Ghana in late 2009. In the second quarter of 
2016, six VPAs between the EU and timber producing countries were finalized: Ghana, 
Cameroon, Liberia, Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and Indonesia. These 
countries are in the process of preparing for VPA implementation (Figure 2). Negotiations are 
ongoing with nine other tropical countries, and several others have also expressed interest in 
VPAs. 
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Figure 2. The FLEGT–VPA process in different countries. 
 
The demand side measure of the EU FLEGT Action Plan is the EU Timber Regulation (EUTR), 
which places the responsibility for the legality on businesses that import timber and timber-
related products into the EU (i.e. importers/suppliers). The EUTR came into force in March 
2013. It applies to timber originating from non-EU countries as well as from the EU domestic 
market. The EUTR represents the demand side measure of the FLEGT Action Plan, whereas 
VPAs aim at the supply (export) side. VPAs and EUTR are meant to reinforce each other 
(Jonsson et al., 2015).  
 
In addition to measures introduced by the EU, similar policies have been implemented by 
major timber consuming countries such as the United States, Australia and Japan. In 2008, the 
USA amended the Lacey Act to prohibit the import of a wider variety of prohibited plants and 
plant products, including products made from illegally logged wood. The EUTR and the 
amended Lacey Act prohibit trade in plants that are harvested in violation of the national laws 
of producer countries (Jonsson et al., 2015). Like the EUTR and the Lacey Act, Australia’s 
Illegal Logging Prohibition Regulation 2012 prohibits the import of illegally sourced wood 
into the Australian market. The Australian law also applies to Australian-sourced wood and 
wood products. In 2006, the Japanese government introduced the Green Purchasing Law, 
which requires verification and proof of the legal and sustainable origin of wood and wood 
products placed in the Japanese market (the “Goho wood” system). Together, these policies 
have been portrayed as forming a newly emerging global legality verification regime 
(Overdevest and Zeitlin, 2014). 
 
The emergence of these global mechanisms to address illegal logging has encouraged scholars 
to examine and understand their effectiveness in reaching the desired objectives and impacts 
on forest dependent communities (Jonsson et al., 2015; Overdevest and Zeitlin, 2016). Such 
an understanding could enable the EU, the USA, Australia, Japan and timber exporting 
countries to investigate the match and/or mismatch between policy goals and policy tools (i.e. 
policy instruments and means proposed to achieve the desired goals). However, complex 
interactions among mechanisms and policies aimed at combating illegal logging and other 
related efforts (e.g. REDD+; large-scale agricultural policies) make assessing the effect of 
individual policies (e.g. a VPA process) a challenge. This requires robust and context specific 
approaches and assessment frameworks that are still lacking. 
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1.3.3. The climate change regime 
 
The international community recognizes the role of tropical forests in climate change 
(Angelsen et al., 2012b; Sills et al., 2014) and therefore pays them considerable attention, 
notably under the UNFCCC. Forests are both carbon sinks and sources of emissions of carbon 
dioxide. Stern (2006) emphasizes cutting emissions from deforestation in developing countries 
as one of the most cost-effective ways to mitigate climate change. 
 
In 2005, the Coalition of Rainforest Nations (CfRN) proposed an initiative2 called RED 
(Reducing Emission from Deforestation). This proposal to reduce emission from deforestation 
through a market-based approach highlighted the failure of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
protocol to address global emission from deforestation. Two years of discussion expanded the 
RED concept to include forest degradation, an idea strongly supported by the Central African 
Forest Commission (COMIFAC) (Gupta et al., 2013). In 2007, at COP–13 REDD (Reducing 
Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) was included in the Bali Road Map as 
one of the building blocks of a post-2012 climate change regime. Since then, the scope has 
evolved to include the role of conservation, sustainable forest management and enhancements 
of forest carbon stocks. In 2010 in Cancun, the evolved approach was termed REDD+. The 
new climate agreement reached at COP–21 of the UNFCCC in Paris features a very explicit 
standalone article devoted to REDD+ (see Article 5 of the Paris Agreement, UNFCCC, 2015). 
This sends a clear message that REDD+ and forests will play a major role in combatting 
climate change. 
 
Based on the COP–13 decision in Bali, REDD+ can be broadly defined as “local, national and 
global actions whose primary aim is to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation and enhance forest carbon stocks in developing countries” (Angelsen et al., 2012, 
p. 32). The underlying rationale of REDD+ is to make forests more valuable than alternative 
land-uses by creating a financial value for the carbon stored in them. In turn, countries 
participating in the REDD+ mechanism would receive performance-based payments for 
verified emission reductions from deforestation and forest degradation and from removals of 
CO2 from the atmosphere by forest sinks.  
 
Several tropical forest countries are participating in the REDD+ process, and many REDD+ 
pilot projects are being implemented through a number of bilateral and multilateral initiatives 
(Sills et al., 2014). The two main multilateral initiatives are the Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility (FCPF) coordinated by the World Bank and the United Nations REDD programme 
(UN–REDD). Multilateral financial sources for REDD+ include the Forest Investment 
Program (FIP), the World Bank’s Carbon Fund and the UNFCCC’s Green Climate Fund 
(GCF). Germany, Japan, Norway, the UK and the USA are the main bilateral providers of 
REDD+ finance. 
 
The REDD+ mechanism is considered one of the cost effective ways to mitigate climate 
change (Angelsen et al., 2012b; Gupta et al., 2013). Nonetheless, there are still numerous 
unresolved controversies around REDD+, for example national design and implementation, 
land tenure, carbon rights, drivers of deforestation, safeguards and technical challenges, such 
                                                          
2 “Official expressions of support for the inclusion of an agenda item on ‘Reducing emissions from deforestation 
in developing countries: approaches to stimulate action’ have been sent by the following Parties: Bolivia, Central 
African Republic, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic and 
Nicaragua.” (UNFCCC, 2005, p. 11) 
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as monitoring, reporting and verification (Sills et al., 2014; Sunderlin et al., 2015; Visseren–
Hamakers et al., 2012). 
 
1.4. Linking global forest governance mechanisms at national level 
 
As indicated in the previous sections, a range of policies and governance mechanisms have 
been created to deal with complex problems associated with forests. The emergence of these 
regimes – with some overlaps and duplications – raises the question whether these different 
regimes act in isolation or in coordination in ways that build effective and enduring forest 
governance (Gupta et al., 2016; Keohane & Victor, 2011; van Asselt & Zelli, 2014). To meet 
the key governance challenges, such as tenure insecurity, inequitable benefit sharing and lack 
of coordination across ministries, problem-focused learning about policy interactions and 
synergistic coordination that promotes legitimate, meaningful and effective forest governance 
are required (Orsini et al., 2013; Rayner et al., 2010). Although international forest 
policymakers, practitioners and actors have long recognized this problem and have repeatedly 
called for it to be addressed (Eikermann, 2015; Gupta et al., 2016; Morin and Orsini, 2013; 
Ochieng et al., 2013; Somorin et al., 2016), identifying and promoting effective policy 
coherence, regime coordination and collaboration remains a difficult task.  
 
The fact that the broad objectives of FLEGT and REDD+ are similar (i.e. reducing forest loss 
and promoting sustainable forest management) and that they are simultaneously being 
implemented in several tropical countries, raises the question how these policies influence one 
another’s development and implementation (Savaresi, 2013; Young, 2002). Because of the 
multi-scalar nature of forest governance, interactions and synergies between FLEGT and 
REDD+ may take place not only at the global level, but also at the national and subnational 
level (Smouts, 2008; Bernstein & Cashore, 2010). Nevertheless, this approach to policy 
learning and interactions between FLEGT and REDD+ at the national level is still poorly 
known (Duguma et al., 2014; Somorin et al., 2016). A recent evaluation of the FLEGT Action 
Plan (European Commision, 2016) also underlines close cooperation and integration between 
FLEGT and REDD+ to effectively combat global deforestation and forest degradation. 
Knowledge of how they interact is necessary to harmonize the aims, objectives and 
implementation of the processes and to develop synergies and coordination between them 
(Broekhoven and Wit, 2014; Leonard et al., 2016; Ochieng et al., 2016). It would be highly 
beneficial to speed up the national and location-specific implementation of FLEGT and 
REDD+ and increase their cost-effectiveness (McDermott et al., 2012; Rey et al., 2013). 
 
1.5. Study aims and research questions 
 
The overarching objectives of this research were to investigate the potential impacts of and 
synergies between FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ processes at the national level, and to draw 
lessons from the implementation of the FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ processes in the Congo 
Basin to effectively inform the ongoing implementation of global forest governance 
mechanisms. The research was conducted in two forest-rich African countries: Cameroon and 
Republic of the Congo.  
 
The specific objectives were to: 
 
I. Analyse the evolution of the direct and indirect causes of land use/land cover change and 
explore possible policy options to address forest loss (paper I). 
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II. Analyse how international forest governance mechanisms interact and influence each 
other at the national level and compare such interactions between countries (paper II). 
 
III. Develop an indicator-based framework to assess the social, economic, environmental and 
governance impacts of FLEGT at the national level (paper II & III). 
 
IV. Investigate how social safeguards are addressed and respected in the implementation of 
international forest governance mechanisms (paper IV). 
 
The specific research questions were: 
 
I. What is driving deforestation and forest degradation in the Congo Basin countries? This 
question was further elaborated into the following sub-questions: What do experts at the 
national level think of the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation and their 
evolution? What should and must be done at the national level to curb deforestation? And 
how and where should governments focus their limited resources and capacity to address 
deforestation and forest degradation? 
 
II. How do international forest governance mechanisms influence one another’s 
implementation at the national level? Here, the specific research sub-questions included: 
What are the convergence and divergence points of FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ processes 
at the national level? How could FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ reinforce each other, leading 
to better forest governance? What are the challenges that may stand in the way of enhancing 
the synergies between FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ at the national level?  
 
III. How can the social, economic, environmental and governance impacts of FLEGT–VPA be 
monitored and reported at the national level? This question was addressed further in the 
following sub-questions: What are the short-term and long-term potential impacts of 
FLEGT–VPA? How can the intended and unintended impacts be assessed and monitored 
at the national level? What are the possible challenges of effective VPA impact monitoring 
at the national level?  
 
IV. What are the relationships between social safeguards for REDD+ and the promotion of 
forest governance within the FLEGT–VPA process? Here, specific research questions 
included: What are the commonalities and differences between the social safeguard 
approaches of FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ in Cameroon, and how can these be explained? 
What are the potential synergies between the social safeguard approaches of FLEGT–VPA 
and REDD+, and what challenges stand in the way of realizing them?  
 
Together papers I–IV contribute to a broader understanding of the drivers, interactions and 
impacts of FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ in the Congo Basin countries and elsewhere in the 
tropics. Theories and methods from the fields of forestry, social sciences and political sciences 
were used to develop this research, resulting in a multidisciplinary approach to answering the 
research questions. Comparative analysis was employed to study the interactions and impacts 
of FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ under varying socio-political conditions, thus providing 
information that is useful for a wide range of similar situations elsewhere in the tropics. 
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2. Theoretical and conceptual framework 
 
2.1. Overall framework  
 
A wide range of policies and regimes have been initiated to address global forest decline. It is 
no longer apposite to focus exclusively on one regime/policy in isolation (van Asselt, 2014). 
Instead, acknowledgment of the relevance of other regimes in addressing a problem and the 
degree of overlap and interactions need to be taken into account (Biermann et al., 2009; 
Gehring & Oberthür, 2009; Gupta et al., 2016). To that end, there is an urgent need to 
understand the nature and consequences of the overlaps and relationships between interacting 
policies (e.g. FLEGT and REDD+). Such overlap and relationships between different elements 
of policies and regimes can result in both synergetic and conflictive outcomes and influences 
(Gehring and Oberthür, 2009; Keohane and Victor, 2011). They can also pose a threat to the 
coherence and desired impacts of global forest governance (van Asselt, 2014). 
 
This dissertation is composed of four interlinked papers (Figure 3). Paper I explores the causes 
and drivers of tropical forest loss and presents the reasons why countries in the Congo Basin 
are actively engaging in global forest governance mechanisms, namely FLEGT and REDD+. 
Paper II assesses the overlaps, synergies and interactions between FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ 
at the national level. Paper III identifies the key impacts of FLEGT–VPA implementation and 
suggests a method for practical and country-level FLEGT–VPA impact monitoring. The 
results presented in paper II indicate that for better integration and coordination between 
FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ there is an urgent need for an in-depth analysis of problem-focused, 
on-the-ground interactions, particularly on cross-cutting issues that interest FLEGT–VPA and 
REDD+ actors. Finally, in response to this need, paper IV analyses the synergies among 
safeguards of FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ and explores how the mechanisms can support each 
other in designing and implementing respective safeguard systems.  
 
 
Figure 3. Links between the various components of the study.  
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2.2. Concept of governance architectures 
 
Governance has become an increasingly important concept in recent decades, as efforts to 
improve government and public sector performance in solving societal problems turned out to 
be inadequate (Gupta et al., 2013). Consequently, there has been increasing recognition of the 
role of non-state actors (such as the private sector, civil society organizations and civilians) in 
solving societal problems and creating societal opportunities. Important aspects of the 
broadened meaning of governance are multi-actor governance and multilevel governance 
(Larson and Petkova, 2011). 
 
In the forest sector, the issue of governance is gaining currency and a variety of governance 
related problems can be identified, for example a lack of transparency and accountability, and 
corruption and weak enforcement capacity (Larson and Petkova, 2011). These governance 
problems can lead to, for example, high levels of illegal forest activities (Nellemann and 
INTERPOL, 2012) and negative environmental impacts (Alemagi and Kozak, 2010) and 
socioeconomic impacts (Eba’a Atyi et al., 2013). Myers et al. (2006) defined forest governance 
as the decisions and actions that remove the barriers and install the policy and institutional 
systems that spread local forestry successes. The main aim of good forest governance is to 
guarantee fair decision making and benefit sharing so as to ensure sustainable forest 
management. However, good forest governance alone cannot prevent the ongoing loss of 
tropical forests: what is needed are appropriate governance reforms across all sectors that have 
impacts on forests.  
 
There is no internationally agreed definition of global governance. Finkelstein (1995, p. 369) 
defines it as “… governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend national 
frontiers. Global governance is doing international what governments do at home.” Biermann 
et al. (2009, p. 15) define global environmental governance as “the overarching system of 
public and private institutions active in a given issue area of world politics [such as protection 
of the environment]. This system comprises organizations, regimes, and other forms of 
principles, norms, regulations, and decision making procedures.” 
 
2.3. Global environmental governance: fragmentation and synergies 
 
As mentioned, governments and international organizations have produced a wide range of 
legally binding and non-legally binding policies or regimes for managing global 
environmental problems (e.g. climate change) and their diverse causes (Eikermann, 2015; 
Rayner et al., 2010). The present research examined how these policies and regimes interact, 
influence and reinforce each other, as well as their actual and potential synergies, conflicts and 
impacts. The impacts of and interactions between policies often depend on the overall political 
and institutional setting in which the interacting policies or regimes exist and interact 
(Biermann et al., 2009; Gupta et al., 2016; Keohane & Victor, 2011; Orsini et al., 2013). The 
institutional setting varies depending on three forces: the decision making system, and the core 
rules (and principles) and coalition of actors (Gupta et al., 2016; Keohane & Victor, 2011). 
These forces help to account for variation in institutional outcomes and relationships, from 
synergetic (or full integration) to conflictive (fragmentation) (Biermann et al., 2009; Keohane 
& Victor, 2011). The degree of outcomes (and fragmentation) affect institutional performance 
(Biermann et al., 2009; Isailovic et al., 2013). 
 
Following an extensive review of the burgeoning body of literature, this research drew on a 
typology developed by Biermann et al. (2009) to assess 1) how synergetic or fragmented 
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FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ processes are, and the causes of this; and 2) how this compares 
across countries. Biermann et al. (2009) identified three attributes to assess the types of 
fragmentation between policies (Table 2): (1) level of intuitional integration and overlaps in 
decision-making systems; (2) extent to which core norms conflict; and (3) existence of actor 
constellations (i.e. which actors support which policy process). Following these criteria, the 
authors distinguish three types of fragmentation, namely synergetic, cooperative and 
conflictive fragmentation:  
 
– Synergetic fragmentation occurs when interacting policies or regimes are defined and 
managed by core (global, regional and/or national) institutions that provide “effective 
and detailed general principles that regulate the policies in distinct yet substantially 
integrated institutional arrangements” (Biermann et al., 2009, p. 20).  
– Conflictive fragmentation occurs when policies or regimes (a) are hardly connected and 
are managed by different institutions (or different state ministries) that have unrelated 
decision-making procedures; (b) have conflicting or inconsistent sets of principles, 
norms and rules; and (c) major (state and non-state) actors support different policies and 
have conflicting interests.  
– In between the two is a cooperative fragmentation, which occurs when (a) interacting 
regimes are defined and monitored through different institutions with loosely integrated 
and cross-referenced decision-making procedures; (b) core norms are not in conflict; 
and/or (c) there is some level of cooperation between major actors. 
Such relationships and influences can occur at different scales (from global to national to sub-
national), but the types and degrees of influences is more evident between two policies and 
regimes in the same issue area (e.g. FLEGT and REDD+) (Biermann et al., 2009; Gupta et al., 
2015). Furthermore, differentiating the types of influences as such enables an investigation of 
possible political, legal and institutional strategies to move away from what Biermann et al. 
(2009) termed conflictive fragmentation. 
 
Table 2. Framework for assessing the types and degrees of fragmentation in global 
environmental governance (Modified after Biermann et al., 2009).  
Criteria Synergetic Cooperative Conflictive/ 
fragmented 
Institutional 
integration 
One core institution, with 
other institutions being 
closely integrated 
Core institutions with 
other institutions that are 
loosely integrated and 
cross-referenced 
Different, largely 
unrelated 
institutions 
Norma 
conflicts 
Core norms of 
institutions are integrated 
Core norms are not 
conflicting 
Core norms 
conflict 
Actorb 
constellations 
All relevant actors 
support the same 
institutions 
Some actors remain 
outside main institutions, 
but maintain cooperation 
Major actors 
support different 
institutions 
a  Refers to the norms, principles and rules (e.g. legal frameworks) of interacting institutions. 
b Includes state and non-state actors. 
 
2.4. Concepts and approaches used in specific studies 
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2.4.1. Generic drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (Paper I) 
 
Academic research on drivers of deforestation has yielded some noticeable contributions in 
the field of forest land use change (Amacher et al., 2009; van Kooten & Folmer, 2004). One 
such contribution is the forest transition theory (Mather, 1992). Forest transition theory 
provides an overview of forest decline in the long run. Whereas forest land areas initially 
retreat at a high speed, at same point depletion starts slowing down (Figure 4). There is even 
a critical point at which the process of depletion reverses and forest land is recovered by 
expanding into new areas. Three broad pathways of forest transition are distinguished in 
academic literature: the economic development path, the forest scarcity path (see Rudel et al., 
2005 for detailed explanation) and a combination of multiple pathways (for detailed 
explanation, see Meyfroidt & Lambin, 2011, p 347–349; Gupta et al., 2013, p. 27). 
 
 
Figure 4. Drivers and forest transition (adopted from Gupta et al., 2013). 
 
The research of Geist & Lambin (2002) on direct drivers, indirect causes and agents remains 
the key point of departure to understand what drives tropical deforestation. Paper I uses the 
often-cited theoretical framework that Geist & Lambin (2002) employed to systematically 
identify the possible drivers and causes underlying deforestation in the Congo Basin. Geist & 
Lambin (2002) classified the generic drivers of deforestation and forest degradation into two 
classes (Figure 4). First, direct or proximate drivers directly induce agents (e.g. small-scale 
farmers) to engage in deforestation and forest degradation, which results in the loss of carbon 
stocks. Geist and Lambin grouped direct drivers into three general categories: 1) expansion of 
subsistence and commercial agricultural (also supported by (Céline et al., 2013; Megevand et 
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al., 2013; Meyfroidt et al., 2014; Weatherley–Singh and Gupta, 2015), 2) wood extraction 
(Mitchard and Flintrop, 2013), and 3) infrastructure extension (Laurance et al., 2009; Laurance, 
2009). Second, indirect or underlying causes indirectly shape the direct drivers and via that 
contribute to deforestation and forest degradation. The main indirect causes include population 
growth (also supported by DeFries et al., 2010; Gupta et al., 2013; Megevand et al., 2013), 
technological, policy and institutional factors (Angelsen et al., 2012b; Kissinger et al., 2012; 
Wehkamp et al., 2015), economic factors (Megevand et al., 2013; Schueler et al., 2011) and 
cultural factors. Whereas direct drivers are national to local in scope, indirect causes can be 
global (e.g. international demand for tropical forest goods and services), national (e.g. political 
will (or lack thereof) of the government) or local (e.g. poverty, attitude) (Gupta et al., 2013).  
 
Drivers of deforestation and forest degradation are context-specific and vary across regions 
and countries (Gupta et al., 2013); they include cattle ranching in Brazil, subsistence 
agriculture and fuelwood in Africa (Megevand et al., 2013) and commercial agriculture in 
Asia (Hosonuma et al., 2012; Meyfroidt et al., 2014). Taking this situation as a starting point, 
paper I contributes to the existing literature by analysing policy documents and the opinions 
of experts to investigate the evolution of direct drivers and causes of deforestation and forest 
degradation in Cameroon and the Congo.  
 
2.4.2. Concept of Institutional interactions (Paper II) 
 
An analysis of the interactions between REDD+ and FLEGT–VPA processes in Cameroon 
and the Republic of Congo was guided by the theoretical perspectives of regime interaction 
proposed by Gehring and Oberthür (2009). The framework identifies four causal mechanisms 
through which institutional interplay can occur (Figure 5; please see Gehring & Oberthür 
(2009) for a detailed discussion of mechanisms of institutional interaction). The first causal 
mechanism – cognitive interaction – mirrors institutional learning, since for example “the 
members of an institution may discover, and decide to adopt, an institutional innovation 
introduced within another institution” (ibid, p. 133). The authors identify two ideal types of 
cognitive interaction: a policy model and a request for assistance. Policy model interaction 
occurs when the target regime unintentionally uses institutional innovations or ideas 
developed by the source regime. A request for assistance occurs when one regime intentionally 
requests the other regime to adapt. 
 
The second causal mechanism – interaction through commitment – occurs when commitments 
made in the source regime induce stakeholders to modify their preferences regarding issues 
related to another regime. Gehring and Oberthür (2009) identified two ideal types of 
interaction through commitment based on differences in the membership, objectives and 
governance instruments of the interacting regimes: 
 
– Jurisdictional delimitation occurs when regimes address similar issues and have 
similar membership but different objectives.  
– Additional means of implementation happen when one of the regimes having similar 
membership and pursuing the same objective provides additional instruments or 
means for implementing commitments in the other regime.  
The third causal mechanism is behavioural interaction. Here, the source regime triggers 
behavioural changes that affect the implementation of the target regime. The fourth causal 
mechanism is impact-level interaction that occurs when a regime's impact on its ultimate target 
or goal directly influences the ultimate target or goal of the other regime provided there is a 
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linkage in the ultimate target of the two regimes (Gehring and Oberthür, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 5. Conceptual framework for a systematic analysis of the interactions between 
international forest regimes (based on Gehring & Oberthür, 2009). 
 
2.4.3. Policy impact monitoring (Paper III) 
 
Monitoring the efficiency of a VPA and its impact is one of the activities assigned to the joint 
EU–(VPA) partner country committees in charge of overseeing the implementation of the 
VPA. Given the FLEGT Action Plan’s overarching aim of reducing poverty, VPAs include a 
specific requirement to monitor the social, economic and environmental impacts of the 
agreement on the life of local and indigenous communities (Brack and Léger, 2013). 
Assessment of VPA impacts involves analysing, monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended consequences, both positive and negative, of VPA intervention and any change 
processes induced by the VPA.  
 
VPA impact monitoring is a tool for assessing the effectiveness of a VPA in achieving its 
objectives. As such, it should enable the EU and partner countries to test the assumptions 
underlying the VPAs. Examples of such assumptions are that greater transparency, improved 
accountability and better law enforcement will lead to improvements in forest condition and 
livelihoods, or that VPA implementation will lead to increased revenue from taxes and duties 
and to improved access to EU timber markets.  
 
There is no single agreed upon approach to developing an indicator framework for an impact 
monitoring process; as such a system should vary according to the local context and the type 
of issue or policy it deals with. However, some general lessons can be drawn from the analysis 
of existing monitoring initiatives. The practical knowledge in this paper was therefore mainly 
gathered by reviewing and analysing such initiatives that have developed indicators and/or 
indicator frameworks and the processes behind them (e.g. Proforest, 2013; Kishor and 
Rosenbaum, 2012; FAO and PROFOR, 2011; ITTO, 2005; WRI, 2009). Important inferences 
have also been drawn from analysis of the content of official documents such as EU FLEGT 
Action Plan, the VPA texts and FLEGT policy briefs. 
 
2.4.4. Social safeguards (Paper IV) 
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The theoretical framework for paper IV was derived from the growing body of literature on 
local social aspects in forest policy and forestry. The paper presented a list of issues and 
concerns, also derived from a literature review, that should be included in any social safeguards 
approach. Scholarly literature identified three important social issues and concerns associated 
with the implementation of forestry policies: rights to access and tenure insecurity (Awono et 
al., 2013; Sunderlin et al., 2014); inadequate avenues for indigenous peoples and local 
communities’ participation (Chhatre et al., 2012); and inequitable benefit sharing and adverse 
impacts on livelihoods (Awono et al., 2013; Blom et al., 2010; Hayes & Persha, 2010). FLEGT 
Action Plan (European Commission, 2007) and REDD+ related policy documents (e.g. Cancun 
safeguards 1–5, UNFCCC, 2011) also spell out the importance of tenure clarification, social 
benefits and equitable benefit sharing, and full and effective participation. Fobissie et al. (2012) 
and Fobissie (2014) identified similar social concerns in Cameroon. To analyse and compare 
social safeguards approaches under FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ in Cameroon, the list of social 
risks and concerns identified from extensive review of literature on social safeguards (e.g. 
Awono et al., 2013; Blom et al., 2010; Chhatre et al., 2012; Chomba et al., 2016; Dunlop & 
Corbera, 2016; Hayes & Persha, 2010; Sunderlin et al., 2014) was reformulated to cover the 
requirements and assumptions of the FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ safeguards. The three social 
issues related to safeguards considered in paper IV are 1) full and effective participation of local 
communities and free, prior and informed consent (FPIC); 2) land and forest tenure; and 3) 
social benefits and benefit sharing. 
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3. Materials and Methods 
 
3.1. Study countries 
 
Cameroon and the Republic of the Congo (Congo) (Figure 6) are lower middle income countries 
(Table 3) and their economies are highly dependent on natural resource extraction – especially 
mining and timber harvesting. Cameroon has a population of 22.82 million with a population 
density of 414 people per square kilometre, in 2014, it had an annual GDP growth rate of 5.9%. 
Congo has a population of 4.56 million with a population density of 12 people per square 
kilometre and, in 2014, a GDP growth rate of 6.5%.  
 
 
Figure 6. Location of case study countries. 
 
About 18.8 million hectares of Cameroon are covered by forest, which sequesters about 2.5 
million tonnes of carbon in above- and below-ground biomass (FAO, 2015). The forest is made 
up of two major types: dense forests and other forests. Dense forests are estimated to cover 17 
million hectares. The main forest type is rich forest (covering more than 80% of wooded area), 
73% of which is designated for production (COMIFAC, 2013). About 75% of Cameroon’s 
forests are subjected to intense pressure, and deforestation is mainly occurring in the southwest, 
a biodiversity hotspot (Céline et al., 2013). In 1990–2000 and 2000–05 Cameroon had a gross 
deforestation rate of around 0.1% and 0.17%, respectively (COMIFAC, 2013).  
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Congo has one of the greatest tropical rainforests in Africa, covering more than 22 million 
hectares (FAO, 2015), which provides refuge for a multitude of flora and fauna species. 
Primary forests comprise 52% of the total forest area, whereas secondary forest and swamp 
forest cover 4% and 44%, respectively, of the total forest area. The prevailing forest type is 
humid dense forest, especially in the northern part of the country; in the south there are both 
savannahs and dense forests. The rate of deforestation remains low with gross annual 
deforestation rates estimated at 0.08% and 0.07% for the periods 1990–2000 and 2000–2005, 
respectively (COMIFAC, 2013).  
 
Table 3. Land area, population and GDP of Cameroon and Congo (FAO, 2015; World Bank, 
2014) 
 Cameroon Republic of the Congo 
Total land area 47 million ha 34 million ha 
Total forest area 18.8 million ha (40 % of 
total land area)  
22.3 million ha (65.4% 
of total land area)  
Gross deforestation rate   
? 1990–2000 0.10(±0.05) 0.17(±0.14) 
? 2000–05 0.08(±0.02) 0.07(±0.16) 
Total population in 2014 22.82 million 4.56 million 
Population density  414 people/km2 12 people/km2 
Percentage of population below 
poverty line 
28% 33% 
GDP in 2014 US$ 32.55 billion US$ 14.14 billion 
GDP per capita in 2014 US$ 1,350 US$ 2,680 
 
3.2. FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ processes in Cameroon 
 
FLEGT–VPA process in Cameroon 
 
Formal negotiations between the EU and Cameroon started in 2007 and continued until 2009. 
The signing of the FLEGT–VPA was done in 2010 and ratified into national law in 2011. The 
ministry in charge of the FLEGT–VPA in Cameroon is the Ministry of Forests and Wildlife 
(MINFOF), and several institutions have been created to negotiate and implement the 
Cameroon VPA (Table 4). The aim of the Cameroon VPA is to ensure that all timber is legally 
sourced, transported and exported, and to promote sustainable forest management that supports 
the livelihoods of local populations. It is also focused on strengthening forest governance, 
promoting Cameroon’s timber products, improving Cameroon’s competitiveness in 
international markets, encouraging investments in sustainable forest management and 
strengthening the capacity of forest stakeholders (ibid). The VPA process in Cameroon is in the 
implementation phase; that is, it is developing a timber legality assurance system (TLAS) and 
methods of monitoring the impacts of the FLEGT–VPA. 
 
REDD+ process in Cameroon 
 
Cameroon is a member of two multilateral REDD+ initiatives: the Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility (FCPF) of the World Bank (since September 2010) and the UN’s Collaborative 
Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in developing 
countries (UN–REDD) (since November 2011). The country’s Readiness Plan Idea Note (R–
PIN) was validated in 2008 and the national REDD+ Readiness Plan (R–PP) was approved in 
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2013. Cameroon is in the first phase of the REDD+ process. In 2015, Cameroon submitted an 
Emission Reduction Program Plan Idea Note (ER–PIN) to the Carbon Fund of the World Bank, 
which was rejected by the participants in the Carbon Fund. The country submitted a revised 
ER–PIN in May 2016. Cameroon is also, for example, revising forestry and mining codes, 
building the capacity of different stakeholders and establishing reference levels. The 
Cameroonian REDD+ process involves both state and non-state actors (Table 4) and is 
coordinated by the Ministry of the Environment, the Protection of Nature and Sustainable 
Development (MINEPDED). 
 
3.3. FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ processes in Congo  
 
FLEGT–VPA process in Congo 
 
To ensure the legal exploitation of forests, the government of Congo began VPA negotiations 
with the EU in June 2008. Congo signed the VPA with the EU in May 2010, making Congo the 
first Central African country to sign a VPA with the EU. The Ministry of Forest Economy and 
Sustainable Development (MEFDD) negotiated the VPA process and is responsible for 
implementing it. The VPA process in Congo is currently (November 2016) being implemented, 
and the country is engaged mainly in developing a timber legality assurance system (TLAS).  
 
REDD+ process in Congo 
 
Congo is a member of both the World Bank’s FCPF (since 2008) and the UN–REDD 
programme (since 2012). The country began its REDD+ readiness activities in 2008 by 
submitting its R–PIN to the FCPF as a REDD+ pilot country. The latest version of Congo’s R–
PP was approved in 2011. The R–PP outlines, among other things, the country's intention to 
carry out analytical studies on national drivers of deforestation and the possible options for the 
development of a legal and institutional framework for REDD+ (MEFDDE, 2016). In 2011, the 
UN–REDD Programme Policy Board identified Congo as a priority country in Africa, and in 
October 2012 the country signed an agreement to establish a UN–REDD National Programme. 
Congo’s ER–PIN was approved and validated in 2014 (MEFDDE, 2016). 
 
In Congo, REDD+ is managed by MEFDD and the National REDD+ Coordination (CV–REDD) 
is tasked with coordinating and implementing a nationwide REDD+ strategy. The national 
REDD+ Committee is responsible for steering the REDD+ process and coordination across 
important sectors. The REDD+ Consultation Framework for Congolese Civil Society and 
Indigenous Peoples (CACO–REDD) is responsible for the engagement of civil society and 
indigenous peoples in the REDD+ process. The CACO–REDD Steering Committee has 29 
members: 16 members from civil society and 13 members representing indigenous peoples 
(MEFDDE, 2016). 
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3.4. Data collection and analysis methods used in specific studies 
 
General 
 
A mix of qualitative and quantitative research methods was adopted. Qualitative research 
techniques (e.g. in-depth interviews) allow respondents to express themselves freely, which 
enables the elicitation of a comprehensive view and insights into the setting of a problem. 
Another qualitative research technique employed was content analysis of relevant official and 
policy documents (Bryman, 2008). The results of the analysis were used to develop protocols 
for interview and questionnaire surveys.  
 
Quantitative research techniques (e.g. rating factors on Likert scales or responses to pre-
formulated questions) were used to gather quantifiable responses (see paper I). The 
interpretation of data and results was performed using different theoretical standpoints. The 
research can therefore also be described as methodological and theoretical triangulation, as it 
employed a “between-method approach” at different stages of research (Creswell, 2007). The 
data were analysed using descriptive statistics. 
 
Paper I: Evolution of drivers of deforestation and forest degradation 
 
For paper I, the data collection was carried out through 1) an extensive review of the scientific 
literature and an analysis of relevant sectoral strategies and national land use policies and 2) 
in-depth expert interviews. A snowball approach (Miles and Huberman, 1994) was used to 
recruit a total of 50 respondents (30 in Cameroon and 20 in Congo) (Table 4). The respondents 
were asked about current and emerging, direct and indirect drivers of deforestation and forest 
degradation; and policy options to address forest loss in both countries. 
 
In April–June 2013, most of the experts were interviewed face-to-face in English in Cameroon, 
whereas the interviews in Congo were mainly conducted in French. The interviews were 
recorded with respondent’s consent and translated into English (where needed). The 
respondents were asked to weigh the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation on a five-
point Likert scale ranging from not at all important (1) to very important (5) to indicate, 
determine and demonstrate the perceived level of the importance of various statements 
(Bryman, 2008). The respondents made quantitative estimates of direct and indirect drivers in 
the questionnaire and described their reasoning and argumentation during the interviews. The 
questionnaire was prepared in English and then translated into French. Finally, the gathered 
data were analysed through descriptive statistics to determine the numbers and percentages of 
the respondents sharing any given views and opinions. 
 
Paper II: Linkages between FLEGT–VPA and REDD+  
 
For paper II, an extensive review of official documents (including policy briefing notes, R–
PP, R–PIN and VPA texts) was conducted. The results of the literature review and policy 
document analysis were used to prepare a semi-structured interview. Second, in-depth multi-
stakeholder interviews with 30 experts from state and non-state organizations involved in the 
FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ processes in Cameroon and the Republic of Congo were conducted. 
All interviewees from both countries were asked nearly the same set of questions. The face-
to-face expert interviews were conducted in March–May 2013 and recorded with the consent 
of the interviewee. The aim of the interview survey was to obtain information about: existing 
and anticipated, synergetic and disruptive interactions between FLEGT and REDD+; and 
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strategies to enhance synergies and mitigate disruptive interactions between the policy 
instruments of FLEGT–VPA and REDD+. The questions were open-ended to allow the 
interviewees to express their personal experiences and perceptions of the most important 
issues identified from the review of literature and policy documents. Follow-up questions were 
asked for further elaboration. Responses were analysed through descriptive statistics to 
determine the numbers and percentages of the interviewees sharing any given views and 
opinions. 
 
Paper IV: Social safeguard approaches of FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ 
 
An extensive review of scientific and grey literature, including policy documents, briefing 
notes and policy updates, was carried out. The literature review provided important 
information that was used to create a protocol for the interview survey. This enabled the 
collection of more specific and relevant data for the study. The second step was to gather 
information through expert interviews. A snowball approach (Miles and Huberman, 1994) was 
used to define relevant interviewees from state and non-state actors. Thirty-seven respondents 
representing governmental, national and international civil society, donor and technical 
partners, and academic and research institutes participated in the interview survey. The 
respondents were first contacted by email, phone or skype and were then interviewed in face-
to-face discussions in Cameroon. These interviews took place in September–December 2015. 
 
To investigate the matches and mismatches between policy plans and communities’ 
expectations of social safeguards, six focus group discussions with indigenous peoples (IPs) 
(Table 5) and local communities participating in forest carbon payment for ecosystem services 
(PES) projects in southern and eastern Cameroon were conducted. The focus group 
discussions were structured around a set of questions related to IPs’ and communities’ 
perceptions and expectations of participation and FPIC in the forest carbon PES projects, 
tenure and rights, and arrangements for sharing benefits. The focus group participants were 
purposefully selected (Bedford and Burgess, 2001) and included village elders, a village chief 
and representatives from the forest entity. The discussions were conducted in the mother 
tongue of the participants and facilitated by a moderator, assisted by the author of this study. 
Each discussion lasted 45–90 minutes and was tape recorded with the participants’ consent. 
The discussions were analysed for content. 
 
The face-to-face interviews were aimed at capturing different aspects of social safeguards as 
distilled from the theoretical framework. Specifically, we aimed to capture interviewees’ 
perspectives on the content and process of social safeguards under FLEGT–VPA and REDD+; 
and the differences and similarities between safeguard approaches under FLEGT–VPA and 
REDD+ and reasons for the differences and similarities. Concerning synergies and obstacles 
to realizing the synergies in safeguards, the interviewees were also asked to respond to a 
variety of open-ended statements distilled from the literature review. Each interview was 
recorded with the interviewee’s consent. A standard list of questions was used with all 
interviewees. The questions were open-ended to allow the interviewees to express their 
personal experience and perceptions of the most important issues identified from the review 
of literature and policy documents, and follow-up questions were asked for elaboration. 
Responses were analysed through descriptive statistics to determine the numbers and 
percentages of the interviewees sharing any given views and opinions. 
 
34
 
 Ta
bl
e 
5.
 B
as
ic
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s o
f t
he
 si
x 
sa
m
pl
ed
 v
ill
ag
es
  
 
PE
S 
pr
oj
ec
ta  
R
ED
D
+ 
N
go
yl
a–
M
in
to
m
 p
ro
je
ct
b  
V
ill
ag
e 
N
om
en
dj
oh
 
N
ko
le
ny
en
g 
Et
ek
es
sa
ng
 
Zo
ul
ab
ot
 
M
es
so
k–
M
es
so
k 
N
di
m
ak
o 
To
ta
l i
nh
ab
ita
nt
s  
89
6 
55
5 
21
2 
19
8 
14
7 
18
6 
Et
hn
ic
 g
ro
up
s 
M
ai
nl
y 
B
ak
a 
B
an
tu
 (9
2%
), 
B
ak
a 
(8
%
) 
B
an
tu
 o
nl
y 
B
an
tu
 o
nl
y 
B
an
tu
 o
nl
y 
O
nl
y 
B
ak
a 
To
ta
l f
or
es
t a
re
a 
 
19
42
 h
a 
10
42
 h
a 
31
35
 h
a 
32
54
 h
a 
14
80
 h
a 
 -c
 
M
ai
n 
ec
on
om
ic
 
ac
tiv
iti
es
  
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 la
bo
ur
 
in
 B
an
tu
 fi
el
ds
, 
hu
nt
in
g,
 g
at
he
rin
g 
N
TF
Ps
 
B
an
tu
: a
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
, l
og
gi
ng
, 
ga
th
er
in
g 
N
TF
Ps
. 
B
ak
a:
 
ag
ric
ul
tu
re
 
la
bo
ur
 
in
 
B
an
tu
 
fie
ld
s, 
hu
nt
in
g,
 
ga
th
er
in
g 
N
TF
Ps
 
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
, l
og
gi
ng
, g
at
he
rin
g 
N
TF
Ps
. 
H
un
tin
g,
 
ag
ric
ul
tu
re
 la
bo
ur
 
in
 B
an
tu
 fi
el
ds
, 
ga
th
er
in
g 
N
TF
Ps
 
D
riv
er
s 
of
 f
or
es
t 
lo
ss
 
Ex
pa
ns
io
n 
of
 f
oo
d 
an
d 
ca
sh
 c
ro
ps
 s
uc
h 
as
 p
la
nt
ai
n,
 c
as
sa
va
 a
nd
 p
ea
nu
t; 
tim
be
r e
xp
lo
ita
tio
n;
 u
ns
us
ta
in
ab
le
 e
xp
lo
ita
tio
n 
of
 
no
n-
tim
be
r f
or
es
t p
ro
du
ct
s (
N
TF
Ps
) 
a  N
at
io
na
l N
G
O
 C
en
tre
 fo
r E
nv
iro
nm
en
t a
nd
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t i
s t
he
 le
ad
in
g 
pr
op
on
en
t 
b 
W
W
F 
le
ad
 th
e 
R
ED
D
+ 
N
go
yl
a–
M
in
to
m
 p
ro
je
ct
 
c 
N
di
m
ak
o 
is
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 c
om
m
un
ity
 fo
re
st
ry
 o
f E
te
ke
ss
an
g 
 
 Ta
bl
e 
6.
 L
is
t o
f r
es
po
nd
en
ts
 b
y 
ca
te
go
ry
, o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n,
 c
ou
nt
ry
 a
nd
 re
se
ar
ch
 p
ap
er
 
C
at
eg
or
ie
s o
f i
nt
er
vi
ew
ee
s 
N
um
be
r 
of
 r
es
po
nd
en
ts
 in
te
rv
ie
w
ed
 
Pa
pe
r I
 (N
=5
0)
 
Pa
pe
r I
II 
(N
=3
0)
 
Pa
pe
r V
I (
N
=3
7)
 
To
ta
l (
N
=1
18
) 
C
am
er
oo
n 
C
on
go
 
C
am
er
oo
n 
C
on
go
 
C
am
er
oo
n 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
 
10
 
3 
7 
3 
11
 
34
 
N
at
io
na
l 
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
l 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
 
11
 
12
 
8 
7 
10
 
48
 
N
at
io
na
l c
iv
il 
so
ci
et
y 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
 
4 
3 
3 
2 
14
 
26
 
Pr
iv
at
e 
se
ct
or
 
5 
2 
– 
– 
1 
8 
N
at
io
na
l a
ca
de
m
ic
 in
st
itu
te
s 
– 
– 
– 
– 
2 
2 
35 
 
4. Results  
 
4.1. Drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (Paper I) 
 
Experts’ opinions on important indirect causes of deforestation and forest degradation are 
summarized in (Figure 7), which combines the data from both countries. The research behind 
paper I found that 1) institutional and policy factors are the most important underlying causes 
of current and future land use change and (2) commercial agriculture and mining are emerging 
direct drivers of deforestation and forest degradation in Cameroon and Congo.  
 
Besides institutional and policy factors, the majority of respondents considered demographic 
and economic factors as important underlying causes. Important demographic factors were 
population growth in Cameroon and the uneven spatial distribution of population and in-
migration in Congo. The demographic factors are correlated with expansion of agricultural 
land, infrastructure and demand for fuel wood (Cohen, 2014; Geist and Lambin, 2002). The 
most important economic factors driving forest loss in the Congo Basin were market/demand 
growth and specific economic structure (e.g. poverty). Furthermore, technological factors (e.g. 
agricultural inputs) and socio-cultural factors (e.g. concern about the welfare of future 
generations and the environment) were mentioned by respondents as less important underlying 
causes.  
 
Figure 8 summarizes respondents’ opinions on the evolution of direct drivers of deforestation 
and forest degradation, combining the data from both countries. A majority of respondents 
(68%) rated unsustainable agricultural expansion by smallholder farmers as currently an 
important or very important driver of forest loss in Cameroon and Congo. Some respondents 
(38%) rated cash-crop farming (small-scale cultivation of e.g. cacao and coffee) and agro-
industrial plantation as moderately contributing to deforestation in Cameroon at present. 
Moreover, industrial (64%) and illegal/informal logging (56%) along with energy wood 
extraction (46%) – one of the most used forms of energy in the region – were rated as currently 
important or very important drivers of forest degradation. Even though Megevand et al. (2013) 
reported that infrastructure development and mining operation in the countries are already 
causing deforestation, respondents scored the present impacts of infrastructural expansion 
(80%) and mining operation (72%) as low or not at all important in both countries. 
Nevertheless, the expansion of agro-industrial plantations (86%) and mining operations (74%) 
in forested areas were identified as the most important emerging drivers of deforestation in the 
coming years for two main reasons. First, the respective government’s priorities of promoting 
mining expansion and large-scale agriculture schemes as part of the national economic 
development plans. Second, a lack of political will at the national level to harmonize cross-
sectoral development plans. The result indicates that the main threats to the forests of the 
Congo Basin will come from outside the forest sector, a finding consistent with the reviews 
carried out by EIA (2016) and Kissinger et al. (2012). Subsistence farming and wood 
extraction (industrial and illegal logging) will continue to be important drivers in the future. 
This trend can be explained by population growth, a potential rise in food demand, and weak 
enforcement of laws and regulations. However, livestock farming may not be that important 
at least in the immediate future (i.e. in the coming 5–10 years). The increase in livestock and 
thus the expansion of pastureland is mainly expected to occur in the Sudano–Guinean and 
Sudano–Sahelian zones of the countries.  
36 
 
 
Figure 7. Underlying causes of deforestation and forest degradation (modified based on figure 
3 in paper I, combining data from Cameroon & Congo). 
 
Given the complexities of the drivers and causes, it will not be easy to reduce the forest loss. 
The first approach to redress deforestation is to intensify inter-ministerial communication and 
coordination and adopt consistent nationwide land use planning and policy. This should be 
translated into practical reality by having clear objectives to be achieved within a definite time 
limit, and should be accompanied by a legal framework committing all actors and stakeholders 
to actively participate in the nationwide approaches to address deforestation. See paper I for 
the details of cross-sectoral and sector-specific strategies proposed by respondents to address 
deforestation and forest degradation. 
 
Although there will be expansion of agro-industrial plantation and subsistence agriculture, 
paper I concluded that land use policy should give high priority to mapping and allocating 
degraded and low carbon lands for the establishment of agro-industrial plantations and 
improving their productivity. To that end, clear political commitments from the governments 
of Congo Basin countries are needed to ensure that forest-friendly plans are incorporated into 
different land use activities designed and implemented by the ministries of agriculture, mining, 
forests and energy.  
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Figure 8. Evolution of direct drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (modified based 
on figure 2 in paper I, combining data from Cameroon & Congo). 
 
4.2. Interactions between FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ processes (Paper II) 
 
The research underlying paper II examined and compared the interactions between FLEGT–
VPA and REDD+ in Cameroon and Congo by applying an institutional interaction approach 
(Gehring and Oberthür, 2009). Thirteen cases of interactions between FLEGT–VPA and 
REDD+ were identified. FLEGT–VPA was the cause of influence in seven cases and REDD+ 
played that role in three cases, and both processes affected each other in three cases. A majority 
(85%) of the cases of interactions identified were synergetic interactions, implying that 
FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ processes can support each other in certain areas, including 
ensuring stakeholder participation, revising regulatory frameworks, addressing drivers of 
forest loss, and building the capacity of state and non-state actors. There were, however, some 
disruptive interactions (15%) that could potentially produce conflictive outcomes. 
 
Following the institutional interaction framework of Gehring and Oberthür (2009), the 13 
cases were categorized into four causal mechanisms: cognitive interactions, interactions 
through commitments, behavioural interactions and impact-level interactions. The distribution 
of interaction cases across causal mechanisms varied considerably. Cognitive interactions 
accounted for 23 % of the causes of interactions, whereas interactions through commitment 
accounted for 44 %, behavioural interactions for about 15 % and impact-level interactions for 
about seven per cent. The cases of cognitive interaction (mainly policy model, which refers to 
institutional learning) could be underrepresented in the finding because policy learning may 
be a tacit process and thus difficult to detect (Böhmelt and Spilker, 2014).  
 
All interviewees but one perceived that the VPA process has served as a policy model and 
provided useful knowledge that has influenced some aspects of the REDD+ process in both 
countries. Among those identified cognitive interactions, the multi-stakeholder participation 
and consultation plan of the VPA seems to be the most important idea transferred to the 
REDD+ process in both countries. The same networks of stakeholders that were engaged in 
the VPA process were also very actively engaged in the national discussion about the REDD+ 
process (and the current revision of laws) in Cameroon and Congo. For instance, in Congo a 
platform of civil society and indigenous peoples (CACO–REDD) created for REDD+ was 
built on the experiences of a similar platform created to follow up the negotiation and 
implementation of the FLEGT–VPA process. 
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Because the FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ processes work on overlapping objectives, employ 
similar means and have overlapping memberships, commitments agreed on within, for 
example, FLEGT–VPA can affect decision-making within REDD+ by influencing the payoffs 
of available options. In a similar vein, overlapping commitments are made under FLEGT–
VPA and REDD+, such as legislative and regulatory reforms, monitoring impacts of the 
processes on forest-dependent communities, safeguards, and strengthening land tenure and 
property rights. To that end, a majority of respondents noted that both processes can provide 
additional means to foster compliance with and implement the overlapping commitments 
made under the two processes. Whereas VPA provides additional legal means, REDD+ could 
bring additional financial resources. Moreover, REDD+ could provide additional means and 
resources to build the capacities of state and non-state actors and enhance effective 
coordination and communication among sectoral agencies. 
 
With regard to anticipated behavioural interactions, the majority of interviewees mentioned 
that stricter enforcement of the law due to the implementation of the VPA’s TLAS and its 
transparency annex could change the behaviour of state and non-state actors in (or even 
beyond) the forestry sector, thereby supporting the REDD+ process. This could happen in 
reality if improved transparency through information disclosure, as planned under FLEGT–
VPA, empowers the weak and holds the powerful accountable, which remains to be seen in 
both countries. Finally, a high proportion of experts claimed that FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ 
can help each other in addressing direct and indirect drivers of forest loss. FLEGT–VPA can 
address forest loss caused by wood extraction, illegal forest conversion to commercial and 
subsistence agriculture, infrastructure and mining by, for example, improving governance, 
reviewing the legislative frameworks, enhancing transparency and creating space for multi-
stakeholder participation. It is important to note that FLEGT–VPA cannot target legal 
activities that lead to forest loss, for instance legal forest conversion to commercial and 
subsistence agriculture. In this context, REDD+ can support the goals of FLEGT–VPA by 
providing incentives to reduce conversion through, for example, policies that clarify land 
tenure rights and benefit-sharing arrangements.  
 
4.3. Impacts of FLEGT–VPA (Paper III) 
 
The FLEGT Action Plan and VPAs involve a theoretical commitment to impact monitoring, 
which must be followed by an effective, practical system tailored to a country’s context and 
capacity. VPA impact monitoring is a tool to help stakeholders assess the effectiveness of a 
VPA in achieving its desired objectives, and also helps to identify unintended negative impacts 
and to manage them. To that end, paper III provided a five-stage approach to the development 
of a VPA impact monitoring process (See paper III for the details of these stages). The process 
should begin by building a common understanding of the importance of impact monitoring, 
followed by a multi-stakeholder discussion to identify the key impact areas and assumptions 
regarding the changes the partners expect to see through VPA implementation. Only then will 
parties be able to seek agreement on the most suitable indicators for measuring the impacts, 
on potential data sources and on the practical aspects of carrying out the monitoring. These 
stages should lead to a practical VPA impact monitoring framework. 
 
The proposed indicator framework was composed of a set of 46 indicators grouped under 10 
impact areas, which are shown in Table 7. It is important to underscore that the indicator 
framework proposed in paper III is generic and needs to be adapted to suit the needs of a 
specific VPA country or specific situation. This is because each VPA is slightly different, as 
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the agreements are developed in response to the national reality of each VPA country and are 
shaped by the in-country multi-stakeholder dialogue and the bilateral negotiations. Impact 
monitoring therefore needs to be able to measure the specific areas in each country where its 
agreement really aims to have an impact.  
 
Table 7. Key impact areas of FLEGT–VPA in partner countries. 
Key impact area Description 
Forests, market and livelihoods 
Forest condition This impact area focuses on how VPAs influence forest 
conditions and its implications for sustainable forest 
management.  
Economic development This impact area focuses on the contribution of forest sectors 
to the national economic development. 
Domestic market 
development 
VPA countries have included considerations to support 
reforms of their domestic markets. 
Livelihood and poverty This impact area helps to see what has been achieved in 
relation to poverty reduction. 
Governance  
Effectiveness of 
stakeholder involvement  
VPAs require that relevant stakeholders are appropriately and 
adequately represented and that their contributions are 
considered. 
Accountability and 
transparency 
The assumption is that greater transparency leads to improved 
accountability and better law enforcement.  
Illegal logging  This impact area considers the VPAs’ impact on illegalities 
in timber operations and the volume of legally produced 
timber. 
Institutional effectiveness 
and efficiency  
This impact area addresses whether government institutions 
are effectively and efficiently carrying out their mandates in 
relation to the forest sector.  
Right of access and forest 
tenure 
This is related to the VPAs’ objective of strengthening 
regulation to secure and protect access and ownership rights.  
Forest law enforcement and 
compliance 
This impact area focuses on VPAs’ impact on the extent of 
implementation of and compliance with laws and 
regulations. 
 
 
The 10 impact areas identified fit with the overall objectives of the FLEGT Action Plan as 
related to the wider context of sustainability and improved governance. The impact areas are 
comprised of two groups of different natures: 1) forests, market and livelihoods, and 2) 
governance (Figure 9). The first group focuses on changes on the ground and is composed of 
four key impact areas: forest condition, economic development, domestic market, and 
livelihoods and poverty. The second group is composed of elements of a more supporting, 
enabling nature to achieve the desired impacts of VPA on the ground. It includes six key 
impact areas: law enforcement and compliance, rights of access and forest tenure, 
accountability and transparency, stakeholder involvement, institutional effectiveness, and 
illegal logging. These impact areas should not be considered a blueprint because it is essential 
to have an open, participatory, stakeholder-led discussion to develop a nationally agreed set 
of impacts. A total of 46 indicators that can be used to capture evidence of change across the 
impact areas were proposed. 
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Paper III also indicated that the development of the impact monitoring system must capitalize 
on the multi-stakeholder approach and be managed as an open democratic process. Such a 
process helps to build broad-based ownership of the whole process. It also enhances the 
ownership and understanding of the key elements, such as the targeted impacts of a VPA and 
the indicators by which these are to be measured. In addition, it is useful for any country that 
is about to begin developing a VPA impact monitoring system to turn to the VPA for 
inspiration on indicators at the outset. The more the features of the VPA impact monitoring 
system reflect the issues arising in VPA negotiations, and the more familiar stakeholders are 
with the content of the VPA document and key issues, the easier and faster the whole process 
is likely to be. Finally, VPA countries could face a myriad of problems and constraints that 
could influence effective monitoring. A lack of quality baseline data for reliable monitoring, 
a lack of cross-sectoral coordination and institutional capacity, and a shortage of skilled 
manpower are among the main obstacles hindering the success of a VPA impact monitoring 
system at the national level. Political interferences and corruption could also pose serious 
problems. 
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4.4. Social safeguards of FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ (Paper IV) 
 
The implementation of FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ raises concerns about unintended effects 
on the livelihoods of local communities and the environment (Chhatre et al., 2012; Eba’a Atyi 
et al., 2013). This is why both processes envisage developing so-called safeguards, including 
social and environmental safeguards, so that they “do no harm” (Jagger et al., 2014; 
McDermott et al., 2012). The efficient design and implementation of a country safeguard 
system at the national level necessitates an exploration of synergies and experiences from other 
safeguard systems of related processes (Rey et al., 2013). Failure to do so can result in the 
insufficient use of resources and confusing messages, especially in the same landscape where 
FLEGT and REDD+ processes are being implemented. Paper IV presents a comparison of the 
social safeguards of the FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ processes and an explanation of their 
commonalities and differences, as well as an exploration of the potential synergies and the 
challenges to realizing them.  
 
The policy documents of Cameroon’s FLEGT–VPA (e.g. Cameroon VPA, 2010, Art. 17) and 
REDD+ (e.g. MINEPDED, 2013) highlight the importance of assessing the potential impacts 
of the processes on forest-dependent communities through integrated social safeguard systems. 
However, the legal requirements for that are so far largely lacking. The analysis revealed 
important similarities and synergies (for details, see paper IV) among the social safeguards of 
the FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ processes. The synergies include strengthening community 
land and forest rights; improving forest governance, including reform of policies and law; 
designing and implementing communication and multi-stakeholder consultation strategy; and 
implementing the commitment of information transparency and FPIC. This is in addition to 
the crucial synergies in monitoring and reporting tools and procedures, as well as gathering 
baseline information on compliance. A crucial purpose of VPA impact monitoring is to assess 
and report changes related to such topics as the effective engagement of stakeholders, tenure 
and rights, and distribution of benefits (See paper III). VPA’s TLAS also include several 
requirements for monitoring and reporting on-the-ground legal compliance, independent third-
party monitoring and companies’ social obligations. Much of this information is particularly 
relevant for REDD+ safeguards information systems. The observed similarities in social 
safeguards can be attributed to the common origins of safeguards and the overlaps in the policy 
goals of the FLEGT Action Plan, FCPF and UN–REDD, and the general trend and pressure 
from CSOs to emphasize similar issues in all processes. The similarities can also be attributed 
to recent trends in bilateral and multilateral policy processes to develop and use criteria and 
indicators for monitoring, reporting and verifying results and impacts. 
 
A comparison of the safeguard approaches of FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ revealed important 
differences (Table 8). While VPA adopts legality-based safeguards, REDD+ uses right-based 
safeguards. The VPA makes a legally binding commitment to monitoring and reporting the 
social safeguards, but this is not the case for REDD+. While neither the FLEGT Action Plan 
nor the Cameroon VPA elaborates the details of social safeguards, several mechanisms and 
options are under consideration in the REDD+ safeguard. Whereas VPA makes no reference 
to FPIC, in 2014 the REDD+ process adopted and validated FPIC guidelines, although FPIC 
requirements have not been fully met in the field. Moreover, REDD+ social safeguard 
compliance is a trigger for result-based incentives; under the VPA process it is a legal 
obligation and linked to market access. In addition, whereas VPA mainly includes plans for a 
vertical distribution of benefits, REDD+ considers the vertical and horizontal modes of sharing 
benefits. A majority of interviewees attributed the observed differences in social safeguards to 
the difference in approaches between the processes. The Cameroon VPA was negotiated and 
43 
 
formulated as an agreement that aims to ensure legality, improve governance and alleviate 
poverty. In this context and with the view of addressing negative unintended effects that could 
arise, the article on social safeguards and commitment for VPA impact monitoring were 
included in the VPA agreement. REDD+, on the other hand, was not considered a mechanism 
aimed at improving governance, and therefore stakeholders ensured the inclusion of social 
safeguards.  
 
Another interesting finding presented in paper IV is that neither FLEGT–VPA nor REDD+ 
can effectively address the crucial issue of tenure and customary rights in Cameroon. This is 
mainly because of the weakness inherent in the approach and design of the processes as well 
as the existing political and institutional setting of the country. For instance, to strengthen the 
rights of local communities and indigenous peoples, both processes mainly refer to the existing 
national laws, which limit local communities’ and indigenous peoples’ rights to access and 
user rights, rather than allowing them full ownership. The approach of basing the legality 
definition on existing legal systems is crucial to gain national ownership, but it has direct 
ramifications for the legitimacy of full and effective participation, benefit sharing mechanisms 
and livelihoods of local communities. Yet again, FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ risk repeating the 
weakness of earlier revenue distribution models, as both plan to base the benefit sharing 
mechanisms on existing laws and revenue distribution models, which have been criticized for 
high transaction costs and marginalization of indigenous peoples and local communities 
(Assembe-Mvondo et al., 2015).  
 
Furthermore, paper IV shows important discrepancies between the safeguard approaches of 
FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ and the expectation of indigenous peoples and local communities 
(Table 8). First, while both the FLEGT–VPA and the REDD+ plan take consultations as the 
main form of stakeholder participation during the design and implementation of the respective 
safeguard systems, indigenous peoples and local communities would prefer a partnership form 
of participation, which could give them more bargaining and implementation power. Second, 
whereas the provisions included in VPA and REDD+ mostly recognize access or use rights, 
the focus group discussions revealed that local communities would like to have, in addition to 
access rights, legal rights of management and exclusion. Third, whereas FLEGT–VPA and 
REDD+ consider the preventive and mitigative roles of safeguards, indigenous peoples and 
local communities, as observed during focus group discussions, would like to have promotive 
safeguards (cf. Arhin, 2014). Promotive safeguards refer to “doing something better” to 
provide spaces for indigenous peoples and local communities to contribute to decision making, 
improve their livelihood and benefit from the processes. That said, the question is what should 
be done to close the gap between the plans in the policy documents and the field 
implementation realities and thus bring about a more just FLEGT–VPA and REDD+? To that 
end, there is an urgent need to reform the tenure and forestry laws that regulate the engagement 
of non-state actors, the distribution of benefits, and land ownership and access to resources 
(Mbatu, 2015). This is in addition to a need to adapt the policy instruments of the REDD+ and 
FLEGT–VPA processes with field implementation realities and local context. 
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5. Discussion  
 
5.1. Drivers and policy impacts 
 
In the context of REDD+, it is becoming increasingly relevant to conduct in-depth analyses of 
drivers of deforestation and forest degradation and their evolution over time, and to prioritize 
efforts to address drivers that are relevant for policy responses (Angelsen et al., 2012). The 
research underlying paper I contributed to meeting this need by identifying and prioritizing 
current and emerging drivers of deforestation and forest degradation considered by experts at 
the national level to have a high priority for policy responses. As discussed in paper I, 
subsistence agriculture and both legal and illegal forest exploitation are important current and 
future direct drivers, and agro-industrial plantations and mining exploitation are emerging 
direct drivers in the region. This situation could be aggravated as the Congo Basin countries 
continue to implement ambitious economic plans for promoting soft commodities (e.g. palm 
oil) as well as logging and mining activities, thus accelerating both legal and illegal forest 
conversion. Economic expansion in tropical countries often leads to the conversion of 
forestlands for large-scale agriculture and mining (Barney, 2011; Meyfroidt et al., 2014). This 
calls for a stable regulatory oversight and the enforcement of strong social and environmental 
standards to ensure that resource-led economic development is both legal and sustainable. 
Although little has been reported about the illegal conversion of forest for commercial 
agriculture and mining in the region (Lawson et al., 2014), paper I makes it clear that this is 
already happening and is set to change in the near future for the Congo Basin. Furthermore, 
paper IV reveals the inability of FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ to address the illegal (and legal) 
conversion of forest. This point is detailed in the following subsection.  
 
Another important finding is that institutional and policy factors are the most important 
indirect cause driving deforestation and forest degradation in Cameroon and Congo (Paper I). 
This result supports similar findings by Wehkamp et al. (2015), who concluded that 
institutional and policy factors are the most important cause of deforestation across African 
countries. Institutional and policy factors fall into three categories: formal state policies, 
political culture and property regimes. Important formal state policies include weak and 
inconsistent legal frameworks, a lack of coordination in formal state policies, and economic 
development strategies to become “emerging economies” by the year 2035 (Cameroon), 2025 
(Congo) and 2030 (DRC). The development strategies seek to transform the economies by 
expanding large-scale agriculture, mining and logging. This coupled with the recent falling 
price of oil has driven the governments to aggressively attract international investments in 
palm oil and mining, which have profound impacts on the countries’ forest cover. 
 
According to the research presented in papers I and IV, the political culture (e.g. corruption, 
vested interests, lack of accountability of officials) is the most difficult cause of forest loss to 
tackle. There are two possible reasons: these factors are inherent in the countries’ political 
economy and are often sensitive issues linked with national sovereignty. It can be argued that 
to effectively address tropical deforestation explicit attention should be given to these, often 
hidden and difficult to quantify causes. Moreover, from a cost-benefit analysis perspective, 
FLEGT and REDD+ may not be the most profitable land use options compared to mining and 
agribusinesses such as oil palm plantations. 
 
Papers I and IV demonstrated that for a region like the Congo Basin, there should be more 
focus on sustainable forest management (SFM) and non-carbon benefits, such as poverty 
reduction and biodiversity. To date, the VPA and REDD+ processes in the countries have 
  
focused mainly on technical issues, for example the development of the TLAS and reference 
level. Less emphasis has been placed on pursuing the objectives of SFM, poverty alleviation, 
the provision of other ecosystem benefits within REDD+ initiatives and sustainable 
development that is resilient to the impacts of climate change. Going beyond carbon and 
timber legality and including socioeconomic development objectives could make the FLEGT–
VPA and REDD+ processes more successful and attractive to local communities, as well as 
attract multilateral and/or bilateral funding (paper IV; see also Vijge et al., 2016).   
 
5.2. Synergies and trade-offs 
 
Despite the proliferation of forest governance mechanisms to address tropical deforestation 
and achieve SFM, little is known about how these instruments influence each other’s 
implementation and performance (Somorin et al., 2016; van Asselt, 2014). Such knowledge 
could help identify ways in which the influences could be managed to enhance synergy (Gupta 
et al., 2016). Moreover, there is little understanding of how these interactions and influences 
compare across countries and how countries could learn from one another to foster synergistic 
interactions and manage negative ones. As discussed in papers I and IV, although FLEGT–
VPA and REDD+ actually originated from different environmental governance arenas, there 
are 13 cases of interactions between the processes. These include improving law enforcement 
and governance, addressing drivers of deforestation, building the technical capacity of state 
and non-state actors (e.g. strengthening the role of civil society), designing multi-stakeholder 
consultations, and conducting monitoring, reporting and verification. It is practically 
impossible to make progress on REDD+ without addressing issues of customary rights, 
conflict, compliance and governance (paper IV). These are among the intended key impact 
areas of FLEGT–VPA (Table 7) – in that sense, the VPA activities can be considered 
fundamental to REDD+. Furthermore, paper II pointed out an important linkage and synergies 
between the VPA’s TLAS and the National Forest Monitoring Systems (NFMS) of REDD+ 
with a view to supporting the generation of verified, legal and traceable carbon credits under 
REDD+. Integrating TLAS and NFMS will bring crucial benefits to both processes, as 
Broekhoven & Wit (2014, p. 166) “reduced emissions could be traced back to their source, 
just as timber is traced to its place of harvest for FLEGT. This would help validate emission 
reductions and qualify them as tradeable carbon credits, where relevant.”  
 
Overall, the main findings presented in papers II and IV on synergies between FLEGT–VPA 
and REDD+ corroborate similar findings of earlier studies in Ghana (Hajjar, 2014; Marfo et 
al., 2013; Ochieng et al., 2013), Cameroon (FAO and UNREDD, 2013), Indonesia (Luttrell & 
Fripp, 2015) and Central African Republic (FAO, 2011). These studies identified potential 
areas for cooperation with regards to stakeholder consultation processes, data collection, law 
enforcement and the revision of regulatory frameworks. The present study differs from these 
earlier studies in two important ways: 1) it analysed the opinions of private sector and local 
communities, which was not the case in most of the previous studies; and 2) it employed 
comparative analysis between countries, providing cross-country learning and experiences 
that are useful for a wide range of situations elsewhere in the tropics. 
 
Even though there has been synergy, coordination between the two processes has not been 
very effective. There are five possible reasons for the weak links between the processes: 
– FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ are coordinated by different ministries/institutions with 
competing interests and often supported by different donors. In the countries, ministries 
are often working against each other in the same landscape where FLEGT–VPA and 
REDD+ are simultaneously being implemented. The stories linked to the Ngoyla–
  
Mintom forest and the agro-industrial Herakles Farms in Cameroon (See Ongolo, 2015), 
the Mai Ndombe landscape in DRC and the Atama Plantation SARL in Congo (see 
Rainforest Foundation UK, 2013) are quintessential examples that illustrate how 
competing land uses and the associated interest groups can develop in the field, despite 
the World Bank, EU, UN–REDD and USA seeking to convince the governments to 
show more concern for the conservation and protection of tropical rainforest.  
 
– In Cameroon and Congo there is a strong division between state actors favouring 
conservation or conversion. There is also similar division among national CSOs and 
within local communities (paper IV). This is widely discussed elsewhere (e.g. Ongolo, 
2015; Assembe-Mvondo et al., 2014).  
 
– FLEGT and REDD+ are two separate processes globally, under two disconnected global 
proponents. In addition, the synergy approach to policy processes by itself is an 
emerging issue even at the international level (e.g. at UNFCCC and the World Bank), 
which has not yet fully moved to national and subnational policies and strategies (See 
also Duguma et al, 2014). For instance, REDD+ implementers in Cameroon and Congo 
have focused on constructing a national monitoring, reporting and verification system 
according to the general criteria provided by the World Bank, which do not make any 
cross-reference to the EU FLEGT–VPA TLAS. Although the national implementers 
have the opportunity to adjust this approach by integrating related components of the 
processes, the global proponents should also ensure that policy goals and tools are cross-
referenced to each other.  
 
– Another obstacle – as also identified by FAO (2013) and FAO and UNREDD (2013) – 
is the lack of communication between and about the processes.  
 
– Finally, there is no defined financial mechanism for efforts promoting and implementing 
synergies at subnational, national and global levels. 
 
Mapping out the relationship between FLEGT and REDD+ on the topology of Biermann et al. 
(2009) revealed two types of fragmentation: cooperative and conflictive. There is an essence 
of cooperative fragmentation between the processes in the sense that the core norms and 
principles of FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ are not conflicting. Both FLEGT and REDD+ have 
several non-conflicting requirements and principles, such as the principles of social and 
governance safeguards, SFM, multi-stakeholder consultation and a credible, measurable, 
reportable and verifiable system. These are some of the opportunities for synergies between 
the processes (papers II & IV).  
 
Nonetheless, the overall types of fragmentation between FLEGT and REDD+ at national and 
international levels, can at present be best characterized as an example of conflictive 
fragmentation. In terms of institutional integration criteria of the Biermann et al. typology, 
FLEGT and REDD+ are operating in “institutional silos” (Morin & Orsini, 2013, p. 46) at 
national and international levels. At the national/local level, they are completely separated 
processes, managed and coordinated by different state ministries (or departments) that have 
unrelated decision-making procedures. In Cameroon there is conflicting leadership between 
MINFOF (in charge of FLEGT–VPA) and MINEPDED (in charge of REDD+) on forests and 
REDD+ (Ongolo & Karsenty, 2015; Somorin et al., 2014), and hence the processes are 
dissociated. In Congo, forests are managed by the Ministry of Forest Economy and Sustainable 
Development (MEFDD) but this is not the case with the environment, which is now managed 
  
by the Ministry of Environment and Tourism. Yet again, FLEGT and REDD+ are totally 
separated processes globally, with almost no coordination or cross-referencing between the 
global proponents of the processes (EU vs the World Bank and UN–REDD). In addition, the 
key policy documents of the processes lack cross-referencing. These “institutional silos” are 
an indication of strong conflictive fragmentation between the processes at the international 
level. 
 
With regards to the actor constellations criteria of Biermann’s typology, FLEGT–VPA and 
REDD+ in Cameroon and Congo are, as mentioned above, driven and supported by a 
constellation of state and non-state actors with conflicting interests. The history of R–PP and 
ER–PIN in Cameroon illustrates this conflictive constellation among non-state actors. The 
Civil Society Platform for REDD+ and Climate Change expressed its support for the World 
Bank’s approval of Cameroon’s R–PP in 2011 and ER–PIN in 2015; whereas the Forest and 
Communities Platform3 requested further improvements to R–PP before approval and rejected 
ER–PIN. Such conflictive constellations among major actors hamper the collective ability of 
non-state actors to advocate for synergetic approaches. 
 
5.3. Monitoring policy impacts  
 
Paper III identified the key impacts of FLEGT–VPA and proposed an indicator framework for 
a country-level VPA impact monitoring, which can be tailored to fit the specific conditions of 
the 15 countries that are negotiating or implementing a FLEGT–VPA, and help in the 
development of the theoretical debate on policy impact monitoring. In 2014-15, a team of 
experts applied the indicator framework for the independent evaluation of 11 years of the 
implementation of the EU FLEGT Action Plan commissioned by the European Commision 
(2016).  
 
As stated in paper III, the nine countries that are currently negotiating a VPA should start 
developing the monitoring framework as part of the final VPA negotiation. This will help them 
to define the baseline, identify the key changes that stakeholders want to see as a result of the 
VPA implementation, the potential data sources, etc. Furthermore, a constraint on VPA impact 
monitoring lies in defining forest governance (and SFM); neither FLEGT Action Plan nor 
VPA provide a clear definition of forest governance. This constrains assessing the changes in 
forest governance due to the implementation of a VPA. Similar problems were encountered in 
assessing the governance impacts of the FLEGT Action Plan (European Commision, 2016). 
To that end, just after the VPA agreement is initiated and before the monitoring framework is 
developed, the representatives of key stakeholder groups should agree on a general definition 
and specify the desired characteristics of forest governance and SFM that they would like to 
see improved due to the VPA implementation.  
 
As discussed in papers I, III and IV, neither FLEGT–VPA nor REDD+ will, with their current 
approaches to governance and legality, achieve one of the common objectives of addressing 
SFM issues: improving the tenure rights of forest-dependent communities. One of the 
weaknesses of the FLEGT–VPA is defining legality with  reference only to (often outdated) 
national policies and laws (paper IV), which is vital for national ownership and legitimacy 
(Lesniewska and McDermott, 2014; Wiersum and Elands, 2013). It is important to note that 
the national laws of most African countries are an inheritance from colonial times (Movuh, 
2012) and do not recognize customary rights, thus limiting the rights of indigenous and local 
                                                          
3Forest and Communities Platform (FCP) is a CSO platform of about 40 organizations created within the 
framework of EU FLEGT–VPA. 
  
communities to user and access rights (paper IV, see also Assembe-Mvondo et al., 2014). This 
approach of FLEGT–VPA could erode the legitimacy of VPA’s licensing scheme. If land 
tenure remains in dispute, the FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ processes will not be sound. It is too 
late to change the legality definition in the Action Plan and the VPAs during the 
implementation stage: countries that are negotiating a VPA should define legality by 
integrating customary and international laws in their national statutory laws.  
 
Regarding REDD+, all six villages surveyed during the research are facing tenure insecurity, 
but none of the countries’ R–PP, ER–PIN and ER–P have developed credible plans to secure 
enduring tenure rights for local communities and indigenous peoples (paper IV). There are 
three reasons for this. The first relates to one of the weaknesses of the World Bank’s Carbon 
Fund Methodological Framework, which only requires that land tenure should be assessed, 
not that indigenous people and local communities should have secure land and forest tenure 
(EIA, 2016; Luttrell et al., 2013). The second reason relates to the weak position of the 
ministries in charge of the FLEGT and REDD+ processes in the countries (paper IV). In the 
Congo Basin, “forest agencies and environment ministries are often side-lined over land use 
and investment decision by the generally more powerful agriculture, mining and finance 
ministries” (EIA, 2016, p. 5). The third reason relates to the existing tenure arrangements in 
the countries that give privileged access to forest resources to powerful actors (see also 
Assembe-Mvondo et al., 2014; Dkamela et al, 2014). This analysis corroborates a similar 
finding by Cerbu et al. (2013), Nkemnyi et al. (2016) and Sunderlin et al. (2014), who state 
that resolving tenure insecurity under REDD+ and the current political economy of the country 
will prove difficult. One potential solution to this problem could be an overhaul of the existing 
national tenure and forestry laws to permanently and legally recognize the customary, 
management and exclusion rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, a solution that 
is consistent with other scholars such as Cerbu et al. (2013), Hajjar (2015) and Mbatu (2015). 
 
5.4. Limitations of the study approach 
 
The study results should be interpreted with caution; as certain limitations have to be 
acknowledged.  
– First, the study relied on perception-based data. The disadvantage of perception-based 
methods is the tendency of respondents to answer questions according to their recall 
abilities and understanding of concepts, which may vary widely even if attention is paid 
to the way questions are formulated and concepts are explained to respondents. To 
address this limitation, a wide range of opinions and perceptions were gathered from 
diverse groups of stakeholders, including focus group discussions with indigenous Baka 
people and local communities.  
 
– The second limitation relates to data representation. To gain a regional understanding 
about the topic, the study was initially designed to collect empirical data from two 
countries. Whereas this was possible for papers I and III, it was not possible for paper 
IV, which was mainly due to resources and time limitations. However, Cameroon can 
be seen as a miniature version of the Congo Basin, and is thus representative for 
understanding the governance context of FLEGT and REDD+ in the Congo Basin.  
 
– The third limitation relates to the weak representation of private sector actors and 
indigenous people in the interview surveys and focus group discussions, respectively. 
FLEGT is a trade instrument and the implementation of VPA in the Congo Basin could 
imply significant effects on the activities of the private sector (Carodenuto, 2015; Eba’a 
  
Atyi et al., 2013). Whereas private sector actors are key REDD+ stakeholders, and also 
an important part of the global effort to reduce tropical forest loss (Hendersona et al., 
2013), the empirical studies in Cameroon and Congo included only eight interviewees 
(out of 118) from the private sector (Table 6). Although considerable attempts were 
made to contact private sector actors, many declined to be interviewed, some of them 
citing that all the information they could provide is available on the company’s website. 
There is little doubt that a better consideration of the perceptions and opinions of private 
sector actors could have provided additional insights. With regard to the representation 
of indigenous peoples, although the study gathered the opinions and perceptions of 
pygmy indigenous peoples in eastern and southern Cameroon, the situation in the 
pygmy communities of Congo could be different.  
 
– Fourth, some policy documents in French had to be translated into English and this 
might have caused some inaccuracy. Furthermore, the sample size of respondents in 
Congo was small mainly because of the limited number of experts with knowledge of 
the FLEGT and REDD+ processes in the country.  
 
– The fifth limitation relates to the delay in the implementation of FLEGT and REDD+ at 
the national level and the fact that national and international arrangements for the 
processes are still evolving. This might have had an impact on the availability of data 
and the interpretation of the results. 
 
5.5. Lessons learnt and future research needs 
 
The findings of this research offer lessons to the global forest governance mechanisms in many 
ways.  
 
– First, the emission reduction programmes of the World Bank and the UN–REDD 
assumed that tropical countries, driven by anticipated incentives, will implement and 
enforce policies and measures that could lead to deforestation reduction (Karsenty and 
Ongolo, 2012). The findings of this research show that such approaches ignore the 
existing realities and political economies of the tropical countries (papers I, II and IV), 
and thus call for rethinking of these approaches, otherwise any efforts towards 
deforestation reduction in the tropics may be unsuccessful.  
 
– Second, although experiences and knowledge of enhancing synergies and managing 
conflictive interactions are still insufficient in practice (Duguma et al., 2014), this study 
offers some clear lessons. The key among these is integrating both processes into a long-
term vision and development plan of the country to secure the much needed political 
commitment of the national governments. The synergies between FLEGT–VPA and 
REDD+ can be managed by: 1) raising awareness and improving communication across 
the processes and their main actors at global, national, and subnational levels; 2) sharing 
experiences and lessons collected by the processes; 3) identifying financial sources to 
realize unified policy implementation; and 4) mapping out cross-cutting issues that 
interest actors of both processes through inclusive governance approaches. Because 
socio-political systems may be quite variable and the manner in which global forest 
policies are adapted at national level varies between countries (Wiersum and Elands, 
2013), possibilities for creating synergies between related forest governance 
mechanisms are country-specific. Most importantly, the strategies to enhance synergies 
between FLEGT and REDD+ in tropical countries should be facilitated by one lead 
  
governmental agency with high political visibility, for example the prime minister’s or 
president’s office. Such a stronger position in the country’s political hierarchy could 
facilitate the synergy approach to policy formation and implementation.  
 
– Third, the objectives, assumptions and policy instruments of forest governance 
mechanisms should periodically be reviewed to align them with the changes that have 
occurred since their establishment. Here, research could play a paramount role by, for 
example, deducing lessons from past policy implementations and forecasting and 
modelling emerging changes. Important changes have occurred since the FLEGT Action 
Plan was conceived in 2003, such as the increasing importance of domestic markets in 
timber-producing countries and regional timber markets, changes in political priorities 
in timber-producing countries and the growing trend of permanently converting forests 
to agriculture or mining (papers I and IV). The changes not only reduce the chances of 
the EU, Australia and the USA of regulating illegal timber entering their markets, but 
also foil the efforts of other major importing countries, such as Japan (under the Green 
Purchasing Law of 2006), that have also adopted legality verification as a means to 
regulate access to their markets. Emerging legality verification regimes – particularly 
the China Timber Legality Verification Scheme should also learn from the experiences 
of FLEGT and adopt a flexible approach.  
 
– Fourth, contrary to the ultimate goal of FLEGT and REDD, illegal and informal logging 
will continue driving tropical deforestation and forest degradation (paper I). Domestic 
demand for timber in the Congo Basin countries is increasing, and timber markets in 
many developing and emerging economies (e.g. China, India and Vietnam) are 
burgeoning. “This means that the progressive policies of Western importers, such as the 
EU and US, have less influence overall” (Hoare, 2015, p. 1). Meanwhile, the growing 
importance of the domestic timber market and the increasing volume of conversion 
timber have resulted in challenges that REDD+ and FLEGT policies cannot overcome. 
This implies that REDD+ and FLEGT actors must re-examine the technical approaches 
of the processes and adapt them to the local context to effectively address the problems 
embedded in the informal timber market.  
 
– Fifth, the governments of tropical countries will remain reluctant to meet the global 
governance demands as long as the FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ processes fail to 
demonstrate their contributions to national economic and social developments. This is 
already compromising the activities of REDD+ on the ground and making it less 
competitive relative to clearing the forest for mining, logging or agricultural commodity 
(papers I, II and IV). It is argued here that even with financial and political promises 
from the Paris Agreement supporting forest conservation worldwide, much remains to 
be proven about the potential contributions of REDD+ to the global forest-based 
mitigation efforts. In the same vein, the economic development strategies of tropical 
countries have become major drivers of deforestation and forest degradation.  
 
– Sixth, international negotiations, which have so far focused only on providing incentives, 
should also turn their attention to strategies to strengthen forest governance and build 
the capacity of law enforcement authorities in forested countries as well as to 
conservation and sustainable forest management. It is important to note that initiatives 
that successfully reduced deforestation in tropical countries during the past decade 
include stronger law enforcement in the Brazilian Amazon forest (Nepstad et al., 2014). 
It is therefore important that incentives, regulations and enforcement must all be 
  
simultaneously implemented in order to promote sustainable management of tropical 
forests.  
 
This doctoral study contributes to the existing literature on the drivers of forest loss, 
institutional interactions and policy impact monitoring in important ways. Needless to say, 
many questions remain unanswered and various avenues for further investigation exist. The 
following are a few of them.  
 
– This study indicates that policy and institutional factors are important causes of forest 
loss. Future research might want to analyse the possible losers and winners from a 
change in status quo, and how the benefits of more forest-friendly institutions and 
policies could also benefit them. 
 
– Further research is needed to investigate how to integrate national economy 
development plans with low-emission, forest-friendly development paths. There is also 
a need to study how global systems of economic incentives tied to emission reductions 
could influence domestic forest land use and associated conflicts.  
 
– Paper III presented a methodological framework to assess and monitor the impacts of 
VPAs. The framework should be field tested to verify whether the proposed indicators 
and the associated information are suitable to monitor and report the intended and 
unintended impacts of VPA and explore whether important aspects are uncovered in the 
framework.  
 
– The research underlying paper II applied the concept of institutional interplay (Gehring 
and Oberthür, 2009) to analyse the interactions between FLEGT–VPA and REDD+. 
The institutional interaction concept is based on the argument that knowledge of 
working procedures and regulations can spread through connections between source 
and target institutions, and that this affects the performances of the target regime. 
However, the exclusive focus of the concept on the performance of regimes ignores an 
important facet, namely whether and, if so, how institutional performance is influenced 
by regime design (Böhmelt and Spilker, 2014, p. 1). Furthermore, the institutional 
interaction concept has been found to be less suitable for identifying disruptive 
interactions between governance mechanisms (paper II). Future research on synergies 
and linkages should consider combining a social network analysis (Böhmelt and 
Spilker, 2014) with the concept of institutional interaction. This could help to address 
these shortcomings. It is worth emphasizing that the ideal type of cognitive interaction 
is not as broad and precise as the one in social network analysis. The concept of social 
network analysis advances the ideal type of cognitive interactions by elucidating four 
specific evolutionary steps through which cognitive interactions occurs: generation of 
information by the source institution, incorporation of the generated information into 
the decision-making processes of the target regime, which leads to changes in 
preferences of the actors within target regimes, and subsequently influences the 
negotiation processes and outputs of the target regime.  
  
  
6. Conclusions  
 
Innovative efforts have been made in the past decade to address tropical deforestation, 
focusing mainly on forest governance and market based approaches. From policymaking and 
implementation as well as research perspectives, it is crucial to understand whether these 
different policies act in isolation (i.e. silos approach) or in coordination. The aim of the present 
study was to explore the synergies between and the impacts of FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ 
processes at the national level in two Congo Basin countries, namely Cameroon and the 
Republic of the Congo. By doing so, lessons could be drawn to inform the ongoing 
implementation of global forest governance mechanisms. 
 
Political culture (especially corruption and vested interests) and institutional factors are the 
most important and difficult causes of deforestation to address because they are inherent in the 
countries’ political economies. These factors are not likely to be changed through the 
implementation of FLEGT–VPA and REDD+. Additionally, the national economic 
development strategies of tropical countries are becoming major drivers of tropical 
deforestation. This implies that any national, regional and/or international policy to combat 
deforestation can only succeed if it introduces sufficient incentives or recognizes opportunities 
that will not harm the national economic development. 
 
There are important linkages and synergies between FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ with regard 
to advancing forest governance reforms, clarifying land tenure, strengthening stakeholder 
engagement and balancing competing interests. This provides an opportunity to make better 
progress on delivering the objectives of both FLEGT–VPA and REDD+. Whereas relevant 
international actors recognize the crucial benefits of policy coherence, the main challenge to 
FLEGT and REDD+ synergy in the Congo Basin lies at the domestic political processes, 
vested interests and institutional ‘silos’ at local, national and international levels. More needs 
to be done to explore how to integrate and streamline domestic politics related to land use with 
the global efforts of enhancing linkages and creating synergies between the processes. 
 
As the FLEGT–VPA and REDD+ processes approach the implementation stage, certain 
problems with the FLEGT Action Plan and Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) of the 
World Bank remain unresolved. The problems include the FCPF’s narrow focus on market-
based carbon credit systems (rather than non-carbon benefits) and the fact that FLEGT and 
FCPF promote existing regulatory instruments that may not necessarily promote sustainability 
and effective participation. The risks also include difficulties in advancing tenure security, as 
well as governance and law enforcement on the ground. Unless this situation is rectified, the 
implementation of the processes is unlikely to protect tropical forests. Instead, it will hurt 
indigenous peoples and local communities and serve only the interests of powerful individuals. 
Forest governance mechanisms should look beyond timber legality and reducing CO2 
emissions, to recognize the significant role of tropical forests in providing non-carbon benefits.  
 
Fundamental governance reforms and a change in incentive structures and enforcement are 
needed if FLEGT and REDD+ are to effectively contribute to the global efforts to reduce 
tropical deforestation. As FLEGT and REDD+ are fragmented at national and global levels, 
there is an urgent need to adopt a holistic rather than a silos approach to the design and 
implementation of the processes. In addition, FLEGT, REDD+ and other global policies aimed 
at reducing deforestation should be mainstreamed into national economic and social strategies 
to help tropical countries shift away from resource-intensive economic development scenarios. 
  
Without such efforts, the processes will have marginal overall impacts on protecting and 
conserving tropical forests. 
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Appendices 
 
Questionnaire survey (Paper I) 
1. Respondent’s details 
Name:………………………    Organization:……………………..   
Email address:………………   Telephone number: ………………. 
 
2. Direct4 causes of deforestation5 and forest degradation6 (DD) 
Each of the items listed below has been identified from literature as a possible direct driver of 
DFD. You are kindly asked to: (A) identify (and rate from 1 to 5) which of the listed direct 
causes are CURRENTLY applicable/important in the Cameroonian context; and (B) rate from 
1 to 5 the potential of each direct cause to be a threat to DD in the FUTURE.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all important Not very 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Important Very important 
 
 
                                                          
4 Direct (immediate) causes are human activities that directly affect the environment and thus constitute 
proximate sources of change. 
5 Deforestation means direct human-induced conversion of forested land to non-forested land. 
6 Degradation of forests is human-induced, long-term reduction in forest carbon stocks. 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1.    Subsistence farming
1.1 Subsistence slash and burn farming
1.2 Shifting cultivation
2.    Cash crop farming
2.1 Small scale cocoa and coffee farming 
2.2 Agro-industry (oil palm)
3.1 Domestic uses
3.2 Industrial uses
4.    Energy wood
4.1 Fuel wood 
4.2 Charcoal 
5.    Logging 
5.1 Industrial logging
5.2 Illegal or informal logging
6.    Infrastructure development
6.1 Transport expansion (e.g. road)
6.2 Settlement expansion 
7.    Mining
7.1 Industrial mining
7.2 Artisanal mining
Other
(A) Current level of perceive 
perceived
(B) Potential future threat to 
DFD
3.    Livestock farming 
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4. Agents responsible for the causes of deforestation and forest degradation 
Please identify the objectives, motivations and incentives of various agents responsible for 
the proximate and underlying causes of deforestation and forest degradation in Cameroon. 
Agent Motivations and incentives of the agent  
Smallholder farmer       
Agri-business       
Agro-industry       
Forest concessioners       
Logging companies       
Artisanal logging       
Mining industries       
Artisanal mining          
Governments          
Other: .....          
 
5. Challenges/barriers to addressing the causes 
Can you identify potential barriers or challenges to addressing the drivers of deforestation 
in Cameroon/Congo?  
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
6. Policy options/strategies to reduce deforestation 
Can you identify measures or policy options to reduce deforestation and forest degradation 
in Cameroon/Congo?  
6.1.  Sector-specific measures (agriculture, energy, mining 
etc.): …………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
6.2.Cross-sectorial 
measures: ……………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………… 
  
Interview protocol (Paper II) 
1. Respondent’s details 
Name: ……………………………  Organization: ………………  
2. Current and anticipated interactions between REDD+ and FLEGT VPA 
 
2.1. In your opinion, how do REDD+ and FLEGT interact and overlap in their design and 
implementation?  
 
2.2. Please (A) identify the type and source of interactions between VPA and REDD+; (B) 
indicate whether the interaction is current or anticipated; and (C) specify the nature and 
quality of the effects of the interactions in Cameroon/Congo.  
 
2.3. Are the legal reforms envisaged and implemented under FLEGT consistent with 
reforms promoted by REDD+ initiatives? Or are they disruptive?  
 
2.4. Does FLEGT influence the implementation and enforcement of the national forest 
sector legal framework in ways that are different from REDD+ initiatives?  
 
2.5. In which areas might FLEGT and REDD+ work at cross-purposes? 
 
3. The challenges and risks 
 
3.1.What kind of challenges do you think will hinder the implementation of synergies 
between VPA and REDD+ processes in Cameroon/Congo? 
 
4. Recommendations for interactions management 
 
4.1. At a practical level, can you identify the (A) actions, (B) actors and (C) initiatives 
needed to create synergies between REDD + and FLEGT VPA? 
 
4.2. Do you know any provisions or institutions that are designed to strengthen the 
synergies between REDD + and FLEGT VPA? 
 
4.3. How should the potential conflicts or interactions be managed in order to enhance the 
effectiveness of the two processes? 
 
 
 
Interview protocol (Paper IV) 
 
1. What are the plans to design and implement a participatory and consultation strategy 
under FLEGT/REDD+? 
2. What land tenure and ownership practices may or may not work under the FLEGT/ 
REDD+ regime in Cameroon? 
3. What are the plans to clarify the legal foundation of the rights of local forest-dependent 
communities to forestlands? 
4. What are the plans to create a mechanism for an equitable benefit-sharing mechanism 
under REDD+/FLEGT?  
5. What attempts are being made to ensure that the grassroots communities are the real 
beneficiaries of the REDD+/FLEGT process? 
6. How can one learn lessons from the experiences of previous benefit-sharing mechanisms? 
7. What benefit-sharing mechanism could work under REDD+/FLEGT in Cameroon? 
8. What are the key challenges or risks in relation to designing and implementing the 
mechanism for sharing benefits? 
9. What kind of safeguards could work for FLEGT and REDD+? 
10. What are the similarities and differences in safeguard approaches of FLEGT and REDD+ 
and what are the reasons for those similarities and differences? 
11. What are the next steps the Cameroon government and the international community 
should take to effectively implement social safeguards under FLEGT/REDD+ Cameroon? 
 
 
 
 
 
